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ADVANCING A NETWORK OF SAFETY MEASURES IN THE
BERING STRAIT REGION: NOW IS THE TIME
Janis Searles Jones, Andrew Hartsig, Becca Robbins Gisclair
Abstract
Climate change impacts have been particularly acute in the Arctic,
where warming has led to the loss of seasonal sea ice, among other
impacts. As Arctic waters experience longer ice-free seasons and
reduced sea ice extent and thickness, vessel traffic in the maritime
Arctic has increased. Experts forecast this growth trend will
continue and accelerate. Increasing vessel traffic brings threats to
the Arctic region, its people, and its wildlife. These include
increased air, water, and subsea noise pollution and the potential
for a large oil and/or fuel spill. While authorities have put in place
some management measures designed to reduce these threats, more
action is needed to safeguard the region. Impacts from increasing
shipping in the Arctic region can be further mitigated by both
Arctic-specific rules and best practices and broader changes to
global-scale shipping practices. More broadly, improvements to
governance structures are needed to better address the multiple and
overlapping threats to the Arctic region. At the same time, these
changes can promote full and meaningful participation by
Indigenous residents of the Arctic with respect to the identification,
design, and implementation of management measures that may
affect their region. On a global scale, reducing greenhouse gas
emissions is critically important for the future of the Arctic and its
peoples and wildlife—and for the ocean as a whole.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change is having dramatic impacts throughout the
world, including on the ocean. These impacts are particularly acute
in the Arctic, which is warming twice as fast as the rest of the
planet.1 Warming temperatures and diminishing seasonal sea ice—
along with increasing interest in commercial exploitation of natural
resources—have facilitated and driven growth in vessel traffic in the
maritime Arctic.2 This growth is expected to continue and
accelerate.
A 2012 article entitled Arctic Bottleneck: Protecting the
Bering Strait Region from Increased Vessel Traffic examined risks
from increasing levels of vessel traffic in the Bering Strait region of
the Arctic.3 Here, we build upon and update that work. While the
focus is once again on the Bering Strait region as the maritime nexus
between the Arctic and Pacific oceans, this Article also considers
maritime traffic in U.S. Arctic waters more broadly.
The sections below discuss increasing threats, review
important advancements in Arctic vessel traffic management, and
address some of the key challenges and opportunities that remain.
They consider how impacts of increasing Arctic vessel traffic can
be mitigated through Arctic-specific rules and best practices
Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., The Changing Arctic: A greener,
warmer and increasingly accessible region (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.noaa.gov/explainers/changing-arctic-greener-warmer-andincreasingly-accessible-region [https://perma.cc/NSC3-X7BQ].
2 For purposes of this Article, Arctic waters include the Bering Sea and waters
surrounding the Aleutian Islands. This is consistent with the Arctic Research and
Policy Act of 1984 (as amended), which defines Arctic to mean “all United
States and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States
territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and
Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the
Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain.” 15 U.S.C. § 4111
(1984).
3 Hartsig et al., Arctic Bottleneck: Protecting the Bering Strait Region from
Increased Vessel Traffic, 18 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 35, 35-87 (2012).
1
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combined with broader changes that affect shipping practices on a
global scale. More broadly, this Article examines how
improvements to governance structures could better address the
multiple and overlapping threats to the Arctic region and better
promote full and meaningful participation by Indigenous residents
of the Arctic with respect to the identification, design, and
implementation of management measures that may affect their
region. Finally, it underscores that reducing greenhouse gas
emissions on a global scale is critically important for the Arctic, its
peoples and wildlife, and more widely for the ocean and all who
depend upon it.
II. AN EXTRAORDINARY REGION UNDERGOING EXTRAORDINARY
CHANGE
The U.S. Arctic is home to Indigenous Peoples who have
lived there for millennia and wildlife that are exquisitely adapted to
a challenging environment. It encompasses vast stretches of marine
waters, including U.S. portions of the sea surrounding the Aleutian
Islands, Bering Sea, Bering Strait, Chukchi Sea, and Beaufort Sea.
The Bering Strait—a narrow marine passage between the
United States and Russia—is a particularly noteworthy part of the
Arctic.4 Only fifty-five miles wide at its narrowest point, it is the
sole marine connection between the Pacific and Arctic oceans and
is a critical migration corridor. Thousands of marine mammals and
millions of seabirds pass through the Bering Strait each year to
access the abundant summer Arctic ecosystem. 5 The region provides
key habitat for Pacific walrus, beluga, bowhead, gray whales, polar

See Appendix 1.
Oceana & Kawerak, Inc., BERING STRAIT MARINE LIFE AND SUBSISTENCE USE
DATA SYNTHESIS 33 (July 2014), available at
https://oceana.org/sites/default/files/final_pdf_bering_strait_synthesis_july_30_
2014_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5PQ-GT2R].
4
5
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bears, and bearded, ringed, and spotted seals. 6 Millions of birds from
all over the world come to the Bering Strait region, including
“[a]uklets, gulls, eiders, loons, shearwaters, fulmars, terns, and
kittiwakes.”7 Yup’ik, Inupiat, and Saint Lawrence Island Yupik
peoples rely on this highly productive ecosystem as a key source of
food security and culture. In the Bering Strait region alone, there are
twenty federally recognized Tribes.8 Tribal communities have many
concerns with vessel traffic in the region. 9
The Arctic is particularly vulnerable to climate change.10 Sea
ice, one of the primary drivers for the ecosystem, is reaching record
lows year after year. 11 Historically, sea ice has given residents of the
Bering Strait a platform upon which they could safely travel, hunt,
and fish, and has offered protection from coastal erosion caused by
storm surge. Diminishing sea ice removes these benefits and
protections, putting residents of Arctic coastal communities and
their food security at increasing risk. 12
Id.
Id.
8 Julie Raymond-Yakoubian, Conceptual and Institutional Frameworks for
Protected Areas, and the Status of Indigenous Involvement: Considerations for
the Bering Strait Region of Alaska, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ GOVERNANCE OF
LAND AND PROTECTED TERRITORIES IN THE ARCTIC 84, 84 (Thora Martina
Hermann & Thibault Martin eds., 2016).
9 See Julie Raymond-Yacoubian, Arctic Vessel Traffic and Indigenous
Communities in the Bering Strait Region
of Alaska, in SUSTAINABLE SHIPPING IN A CHANGING ARCTIC, WMU STUDIES IN
MARITIME AFFAIRS (L. P. Hildebrand et al. eds. 2018) available at
https://kawerak.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Raymond-Yakoubian2018.pdf, [https://perma.cc/6UHU-S4JC] (hereinafter Arctic Vessel Traffic and
Indigenous Communities).
10 Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., The changing Arctic: A greener,
warmer and increasingly accessible region 275, 275 (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.noaa.gov/explainers/changing-arctic-greener-warmer-andincreasingly-accessible-region, [https://perma.cc/NSC3-X7BQ].
11 See generally, Nat’l Snow & Ice Data Ctr., State of the Cryosphere: Sea Ice
(Nov. 20, 2018), https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/sotc/sea_ice.html,
[https://perma.cc/YH9Q-UA6B].
12 Julia O’Malley, Alaska Relies on Ice. What Happens When It Can’t Be
Trusted?, N.Y. TIMES (April 10, 2019),
6
7
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Loss of sea ice also has profound and widespread impacts on
the Arctic marine ecosystem. For instance, in 2017 and 2018, the
Bering Sea “cold pool”—a region of cold water that historically
acted as a thermal barrier between the southeastern Bering Sea and
the northern Bering Sea—shrank significantly.13 This resulted in
large numbers of commercially important fish species such as
pollock and cod moving north. 14 Changes in sea ice extent and the
cold pool are driving fundamental shifts that ripple through the
ecosystem, affecting everything from phytoplankton blooms to fish,
birds, and marine mammals. 15 These changes have direct impacts on
the region’s Indigenous Peoples, who are part of the ecosystem and
rely on these animals for sustenance and culture.
Climate change also facilitates commercial and industrial
activity by making the region more accessible. 16 Going forward, the
Arctic will almost certainly experience increased activity from

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/us/alaska-ice-melting.html?auth=loginemail&login=email, [https://perma.cc/5V9J-WQZM].
13 Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Scientific Teams Set Out to Track
Unprecedented Changes in the Eastern Bering Sea (April 18, 2018),
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/feature-story/scientific-teams-set-out-trackunprecedented-changes-eastern-bering-sea [https://perma.cc/VDD4-7LZU].
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 A. Siders et al., A dynamic ocean management proposal for the Bering Strait
region, 74 MARINE POLICY 177, 178 (2016).
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commercial fishing, 17 oil and gas development, 18 and onshore
mining operations in Canada and the United States. 19 Vessel traffic
is expected to grow in support of these extractive industries.20 The
shipping sector also uses Arctic waters to connect ports in North
America and Europe to ports in Asia. 21 Trans-Arctic shipping routes
include the Northern Sea Route, which traverses waters north of
Russia, and the Northwest Passage, which threads through
archipelagic waters north of Canada. As Arctic sea ice continues to
diminish, the Transpolar Sea Route—which runs “over the top” via
the North Pole—could also become a viable option for trans-Arctic
shipping, perhaps, as early as mid-century.22 Importantly, the
That said, there are precautionary fishing management measures in place in
Arctic waters. For instance, the northern Bering Sea is currently closed to
bottom trawling. See Amendment 89 to the Fishery Management Plan for
Groundfish of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Management Area (FMP) to
Establish Bering Sea Habitat Conservation Measures, Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg.
43,362 (July 25, 2008). The high seas of the Central Arctic Ocean and the U.S.
Arctic fishery management area north of the Bering Strait are currently closed to
commercial fishing. See Agreement to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in
the Central Arctic Ocean (Oct. 3, 2018); available at https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2019.073.01.0003.01.ENG,
[https://perma.cc/X2NC-9KPH]; and N. Pac. Fisheries Mgm’t Council, FISHERY
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR FISH RESOURCES OF THE ARCTIC MANAGEMENT AREA
(2009), available at https://www.npfmc.org/wpcontent/PDFdocuments/fmp/Arctic/ArcticFMP.pdf [https://perma.cc/HD2PRDF5].
18 While the Bering Strait region and other Arctic waters are not currently open
for offshore oil and gas leasing, they have been targeted for future leasing by the
Trump Administration’s 2019–2024 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and
Gas Leasing Draft Proposed Program. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgm’t, 2019–
2024 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Draft Proposed
Program 1 (2018).
19 U.S. Comm. on the Marine Transp. Sys., Draft: A Ten-Year Projection of
Maritime Activity in the U.S. Arctic Region, 2020-2030 37–42 (July 2019)
[hereinafter CMTS 2019 Draft Projection], available at
https://www.cmts.gov/downloads/2019_ArcticVesselProjections_draft.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DL9C-ZY6R].
20 See generally id.
21 See Appendix 2.
22 See id. at 70–71 (noting that while the transpolar sea route is not expected to
open to most vessels before mid-century, its use could grow quickly when it
17
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Northern Sea Route, the Northwest Passage, and the Transpolar Sea
Route all pass through the Bering Strait to connect the Arctic Ocean
to the Bering Sea and Pacific Ocean.
The bulk of this Article focuses on managing shipping
activities in U.S. Arctic waters. However, impacts from increased
vessel traffic are just one strand in a much broader web of changes
affecting the region. Given the multiple threats it faces, effective
management of the Arctic region will require a comprehensive
approach to governance, including full and meaningful involvement
in decision-making by Indigenous residents. More broadly, it will
require global-scale action to address the fundamental threat of
climate change.
III. ARCTIC VESSEL TRAFFIC: OPERATIONS, ROUTES, GROWTH
TRENDS, AND ASSOCIATED RISKS
The volume of vessel traffic in the Arctic has already grown
substantially and is predicted to continue to grow in the future.23 As
Arctic vessel traffic increases, so do impacts from and risks of
conflicts and accidents.
A.

Arctic Vessel Operations and Predictions for Growth

Many economic sectors contribute to the overall volume of
vessel traffic in Arctic waters. Commercial operators bring supplies
and fuel to western Alaska communities using tugs, barges, and
tankers.24 Extractive industries—including oil and gas and mining

becomes seasonally ice-free). See also James E. Overland & Muyin Wang,
When will the summer Arctic be nearly sea ice free? 40 GEOPHYSICAL RES.
LETTERS 2097, 2097 (2013) (noting future sea ice loss in the Arctic is very
likely in the “first half of the 21st century, with a possibility of major loss within
a decade or two”).
23 CMTS 2019 Draft Projection, supra note 19, at vi.
24 Nuka Res. & Planning Group, LLC, OVERVIEW OF TANKER LIGHTERING IN
ARCTIC ALASKA 2-3 (2019) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF TANKER LIGHTERING],
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operations—generate significant levels of vessel traffic. 25 Cruise
ships of varying sizes take tourists to destinations in the Arctic. A
large and economically important commercial fishing fleet operates
in southern portions of the Bering Sea, 26 and scientists conduct
studies from research vessels.27 In addition to these commercial
operations, subsistence hunters pursue marine mammals from small
skiffs, sometimes operating far from shore. 28
Relative to other global shipping routes, the U.S. Arctic and
the Bering Strait currently experience low volumes of commercial
vessel traffic.29 Nonetheless, traffic levels in the region have already

available at https://oceanconservancy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/190306OC-Lightering-Report-vFINAL.pdf, [https://perma.cc/V5GW-JX7U].
25 See, e.g., Nuka Res. & Planning Group, LLC, BERING SEA VESSEL TRAFFIC
RISK ANALYSIS 49 (2016) (noting that vessel traffic from Shell’s offshore oil
and gas exploration in 2015 generated a spike in vessel traffic) [hereinafter
BERING SEA RISK ANALYSIS], available at https://oceanconservancy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/bering-sea-vessel-traffic-1.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/L3QU-652C].
26 N. Pac. Fishery Mgm’t Council, BERING SEA FISHERY ECOSYSTEM PLAN 75
(Jan. 2019) available at
https://meetings.npfmc.org/CommentReview/DownloadFile?p=c334ad33-41394b5a-b205a8b7c5028562.pdf&fileName=D6%20Final%20BS%20FEP%20Jan%202019.p
df [https://perma.cc/5KQ6-K43S].
27 B. Konar et al., Development of best practices for scientific research vessel
operations in a
changing Arctic: A case study for R/V Sikuliaq, 86 MARINE POLICY 182, 182-83
(2017) (noting increased use of research vessels in Arctic waters), available at
https://www.unols.org/sites/default/files/Sikuliaq%20Marine%20Policy%20pap
er.pdf [https://perma.cc/MUT4-4YX3].
28 See, e.g, Oceana & Kawerak, Inc., supra note 5, at 112 (noting hunters may
travel up to 100 miles from their communities).
29 See, e.g., Benjamin Glick, Is the Arctic Shipping Route Closer to being a
Viable Alternative?, TRADING THOUGHTS: GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIV. VAN
ANDEL GLOBAL TRADE CTR. (undated),
https://vagtc.wordpress.com/2017/02/20/is-the-arctic-shipping-route-closer-tobeing-a-viable-alternative/ [https://perma.cc/7BW5-DVE6] (noting that while
fewer than 20 ships went through the Arctic passages in 2015, almost 14,000
ships transited the Panama Canal and 18,000 transited the Suez Canal).
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experienced substantial increases in recent years.30 As Arctic sea ice
continues to diminish31 and the ice-free season continues to
lengthen, vessel traffic in the region is expected to keep growing. 32
1.

Trans-Arctic Shipping

Going forward, shipping companies will likely make greater
use of trans-Arctic shipping routes to transport cargo. These routes
save significant time and fuel, particularly when transiting from
Asia to Europe. In the years ahead, the Northern Sea Route is poised
to experience significant growth in transit traffic, which could
“dramatically alter the spread of vessel types transiting through the
Bering Strait.”33 For instance, in 2018 a Maersk ship became the
first to use the Northern Sea Route to transport containerized cargo,
a voyage that may herald more widespread use of the route by
container ships in the future. 34 In addition, it is not too early to
consider potential future use of the Transpolar Sea Route for
commercial shipping. Persistent ice makes the route impractical at
this time. However, as the Transpolar Sea Route becomes seasonally
ice-free, traffic along the route could increase rapidly, in part
“because the Transpolar Sea Route does not have the same draft
restrictions as other trans-Arctic passages.”35 As noted above, all
trans-Arctic shipping routes pass through the Bering Strait, so
increased use of any, or all of these routes, will result in increased
traffic through the Strait.

See CMTS 2019 Draft Projection, supra note 19, at 15 (noting vessel traffic in
the Bering Strait region has “steadily climbed since data collection began in
2008, resulting in a 128% growth in 2018 over 2008 levels”).
31 See, e.g., Nat’l Snow & Ice Data Ctr., supra note 11, (describing trends in
Arctic sea ice loss).
32 CMTS 2019 Draft Projection, supra note 19, at 68 (summarizing scenarios
projecting vessel traffic growth in the U.S. Arctic region).
33 Id. at 41.
34 Id. at 40.
35 Id. at 109.
30
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Arctic Marine Tourism

Maritime tourism is another growth sector in the Arctic. In
2016, the Crystal Serenity became the first large luxury cruise ship
to transit the Northwest Passage, a feat it repeated in 2017. 36 The
company, Crystal Cruises, plans to return to Alaska in the future
using a new, smaller, purpose-built polar-class vessel.37 Crystal
Cruises is far from the only such company to invest in new ships
intended for Arctic waters. A 2018 review found that at least twentyeight new expedition cruise ships capable of operating in Arctic
waters would be launched within four years. 38 Many of the new
vessels will have robust construction that qualifies them to sail in
more challenging and remote waters. 39 As just one example, French
operator Ponant intends to launch a specially-constructed vessel
called Le Commandant Charcot, with plans to sail to the North Pole
starting in 2021.40
3.

Community Resupply and Infrastructure

Vessel traffic that serves the needs of local Arctic
communities is also poised to increase. Tug-and-barge and tanker
Maritime Executive, New Crystal Ship for Northwest Passage (Oct. 1, 2017),
https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/new-crystal-ship-for-northwestpassage [https://perma.cc/J3RL-D938].
37 Id. See also Crystal Cruises, Crystal Expedition Cruises Appoints Captain
Thomas Larsen to Helm Crystal Endeavor (June 18, 2019) (noting plans to sail
to Alaska, the Aleutian Islands and the Northeast Passage, among other
destinations), available at http://mediacenter.crystalcruises.com/crystalexpedition-cruises-appoints-captain-thomas-larsen-to-helm-crystal-endeavor/
[https://perma.cc/L56U-58G7].
38 Thomas Nilsen, Arctic cruise ship boom, BARENTS OBSERVER, May 22, 2018,
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/travel/2018/05/arctic-cruise-ship-boom
[https://perma.cc/HH2S-J8B7].
39 See id. (noting new builds will be a “higher ice-class”).
40 Malte Humpert, France’s Ponant to offer North Pole cruises starting in 2021,
HIGH NORTH NEWS (May 22, 2019), https://www.arctictoday.com/francesponant-to-offer-north-pole-cruises-starting-in-2021/ [https://perma.cc/JP4EQPB5].
36
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traffic delivers supplies and fuel to coastal communities in Arctic
Alaska that are not connected to the road system. While community
resupply in Alaska has been stable for the past twenty-five or more
years,41 recent reports indicate there may be an increase in the
number of transits associated with this sector as operators expand
service to northern communities and industrial areas.42 In addition,
community infrastructure projects in western and Arctic Alaska—
ranging from port and road construction to airport runway and
renewable wind energy projects—will likely generate additional
vessel traffic as supplies are brought into the region. 43
4.

Extractive Industries

As noted earlier, development and extraction of natural
resources from the Arctic is also expected to contribute to a growth
in vessel traffic in the region. Northern Sea Route cargo traffic
associated with extractive industries is forecast to grow as Russia
continues to bring online Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 44 and
potential oil and coal development projects.45 The first shipment of
LNG from Russia’s Yamal LNG project occurred in 2017.46 Going
forward, Russia plans to ship more than a million tons of LNG from
Yamal to markets in Europe and Asia using special icebreaking
tankers.47 Overall, the Russian government has decreed the volume

BERING SEA RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 23, at 58.
CMTS 2019 Draft Projection, supra note 19, at 62.
43 Id. at 49-57.
44 Id. at 34.
45 See Ariel Cohen, Russia Sets Sights On Energy Resources Under Arctic
Circle, FORBES (April 17, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/04/17/russia-sets-sights-onenergy-resources-under-arctic-circle/#13828dd6eea7 (describing potential oil
and coal projects in the Russian Arctic and the need for additional vessels to
facilitate development of those projects) [https://perma.cc/ZA6S-RD8C].
46 CMTS 2019 Draft Projection, supra note 19, at 34.
47 Id.
41
42
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of goods shipped via the Northern Sea Route increase eight-fold
from 2017 levels, reaching 80 million tons per year 2024.48
In United States waters, any future exploration or
development of Arctic oil and gas resources—both onshore and
offshore—could also trigger significant increases in vessel traffic in
the region.49 Shell’s efforts to explore for oil in the U.S. Arctic
Ocean, for instance, generated substantial increases in transits of the
Bering Strait.50 In addition to oil and gas activities, new or expanded
onshore mining operations in Alaska could trigger growth in Arctic
vessel traffic, which would come on top of vessel traffic that
supports ongoing operations at the Red Dog mine.51 Similarly,
expansion of mining operations in Arctic Canada could contribute
to continued growth in vessel traffic. 52
5.

Other Sources of Growth in Arctic Vessel Traffic

Other sectors may contribute to growth in vessel traffic in
the U.S. Arctic and the Bering Strait region as well. Commercial
fishing vessels may move into more northerly waters as they pursue

Charles Digges, Putin decrees an increase in Arctic traffic, THE MARITIME
EXECUTIVE (May 16, 2019), https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/putindecrees-an-increase-in-arctic-traffic [https://perma.cc/QYA6-ANNL]. See also
Vladimir Putin, O natsionalnykh tselyakh i strategicheskikh zadachakh razbitiya
Rossiskoy Federatsii na period do 2024 goda, (About national goals and
strategic development objectives for the period up to 2024), DECREE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FED. NO. 204 (May 7, 2018), https://xn--d1aqf.xn-p1ai/media/news/ukaz-o-natsionalnykh-tselyakh-i-strategicheskikh-zadachakhrazvitiya-rossiyskoy-federatsii-na-period/ (calling for development and
expanded use of Northern Sea Route) [https://perma.cc/EE3X-M54N].
49 CMTS 2019 Draft Projection, supra note 19, at 30–34.
50 BERING SEA RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 25, at 49. See also CMTS 2019 Draft
Projection, supra note 18, at 12 (noting that Shell’s “drill ship, anchor handling
vessels, and anti-pollution ships” resulted in a surge of vessel activity in the
region).
51 See CMTS 2019 Draft Projection, supra note 19.
52 See Id.
48
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valuable fish stocks moving northward.53 The number of research
vessels in the region has already increased, and would likely
increase more, if and when commercial fishing expands
northward.54 Overall, the number of vessels conducting research,
law enforcement, and search and rescue activities in U.S. Arctic
waters has increased, and is likely to continue to grow as “the
demand for real-time environmental data in the region increases.” 55
Autonomous vessels may also contribute to this pattern of growth.56
B.

Increasing Shipping Presents Risks to Safety and the
Marine Environment

As Arctic shipping traffic increases, so do its attendant risks.
This section focuses on accidents that could jeopardize human life;
conflicts with other maritime users; water, air, and noise pollution;
ship strikes; and introduction of invasive species.
1.

Vessel Accidents in the Arctic May Jeopardize Human Lives
and Property

Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 41-43.
55 Id. at 40.
56 Id.
53
54
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Arctic waters are widely recognized as remote, 57
hazardous,58 and poorly charted.59 Although modern vessels are
highly capable, they are still vulnerable to accidents including
damage caused by grounding, collision, or other sources; fires or
explosions; failure of engines or other machinery; and other issues.60
These accidents can jeopardize the lives of passengers and crew.
Challenging conditions and lack of infrastructure mean that
search and rescue operations in the Arctic marine environment are
highly demanding.61 The U.S. Coast Guard “does not currently have
the capability or capacity necessary to assure access in the high
latitudes,” which “limits [its] ability to proactively manage risks”

For example, the Coast Guard Air Station in Kodiak, Alaska—the nearest
permanent base to the Arctic Ocean—is roughly 820 nautical miles south of the
coastal community of Utqiagvik on Alaska’s North Slope. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Security, ARCTIC SEARCH AND RESCUE: FISCAL YEAR 2017 REPORT
TO CONGRESS (March 13, 2018), at 5, available at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/USCG%20%20Arctic%20Search%20and%20Rescue_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2835WWU6].
58 Arctic waters are susceptible to “ice, dense fog, storms, high winds and
waves, and freezing temperatures,” among other challenges. Pew Charitable
Trusts, ARCTIC STANDARDS: RECOMMENDATIONS ON OIL SPILL PREVENTION, at
6, RESPONSE, AND SAFETY IN THE U.S. ARCTIC OCEAN (Sept. 2013), available at
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2013/09/23/arcticstandardsfinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MN5K-FXA5].
59 As of late 2018, it was reported that just 4.1 percent of the Arctic waters off
the coast of Alaska were charted to modern standards. Dermot Cole, Outdated
navigational charts are an Arctic maritime disaster in the making, ARCTIC
TODAY (Sept. 10, 2018), at 2, https://www.arctictoday.com/outdatednavigational-charts-arctic-maritime-disaster-making/ [https://perma.cc/B46X2PVA].
60 Arctic Council, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 87 (2009) [hereinafter
AMSA 2009],
https://www.pame.is/images/03_Projects/AMSA/AMSA_2009_report/AMSA_2
009_Report_2nd_print.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC7U-9MPQ].
61 Timothy William James Smith, Search and Rescue in the Arctic: is the U.S.
Prepared? 17 (Pardee RAND Grad. Sch., 2016),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD382.html
[https://perma.cc/TJN9-5VNQ].
57
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and “threatens the Nation’s ability to respond to crises in the Arctic,
ranging from oil spills to contingency operations.”62
While not in the U.S. Arctic, a recent incident in Norwegian
waters highlights the harsh reality of these risks. In late March 2019,
a passenger cruise ship traveling approximately 200 miles south of
the Arctic Circle lost engine power amid gale-force winds and rough
seas.63 Large waves battered the ship, smashing windows and
sweeping passengers off their feet. Over 450 passengers were
airlifted from the vessel. 64 The ship eventually made it to a
Norwegian port under its own power with nearly 900 passengers and
crew still onboard.65 While no lives were lost, numerous passengers
were injured66 and the rescue operation was a dangerous and costly
undertaking. As more ships travel in Arctic waters, the potential for
an accident that jeopardizes human life only increases.
2.

Oil Spills from Vessels Threaten the Arctic Marine
Environment

A 2009 Arctic Council analysis concluded “[r]elease of oil
into the Arctic marine environment, either through accidental
release, or illegal discharge, is the most significant threat from

U.S. Coast Guard, ARCTIC STRATEGIC OUTLOOK 26 (April 2019), at 6,11,24,
https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_2019
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6A2K-ARG3].
63 Simon Calder, Viking Sky: Why Things Went Wrong, What Happened and
What's Next? INDEPENDENT, https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-andadvice/viking-sky-what-happened-storm-norway-emergency-evacuation-coasta8837371.html [https://perma.cc/TKJ5-G8W8].
64 Id.
65 David Oliver, Five Helicopters, 28 rescuers, 464 saved: Inside the Viking Sky
Cruise Ship Rescue, USA TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/cruises/2019/03/28/viking-sky-cruiseship-norway-inside-rescue-mission/3298517002/ [https://perma.cc/N69E-34H8].
66 Calder, supra note 63.
62
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shipping activity.”67 This threat exists wherever vessels use,
transport, or store oil or oil products. 68
Oils may be persistent (such as heavy fuel oil) 69 or nonpersistent (such as diesel fuels, gasoline, and jet fuel). 70 When
spilled into the marine environment, persistent fuels tend to remain
recognizable and may spread as an oil slick or strand on the shore. 71
Non-persistent fuels, on the other hand, tend to evaporate or dissolve
when spilled into the water. 72 Both persistent and non-persistent
fuels are toxic and negatively impact fish and wildlife via multiple
pathways.73 That said, heavy fuel oil is recognized as particularly
dangerous if it is spilled, especially in colder waters. 74
Ships that carry large volumes of oil and spend longer
periods of time in a particular region present the largest oil hazard
exposure for that region. 75 In addition, ships using or carrying
persistent fuels create more hazard exposure than non-persistent
fuels.76 An analysis of vessel traffic in the Bering Sea concluded that
large cargo vessels using persistent oil as a fuel for propulsion and
tankers carrying non-persistent fuel as cargo represented the greatest
oil spill hazard exposure. 77 On the U.S. side of the Bering Strait,
AMSA 2009, supra note 60, at 152.
BERING SEA RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 25, at 17.
69 Id. at 35.
70 Id. at 19.
71 Id. When spilled into the marine environment, persistent fuels tend to remain
recognizable and may spread as an oil slick or strand on the shore. Id. at 20.
72 Id. at 20.
73 Id.
74 Det Norske Veritas, REPORT: HEAVY FUEL OIL IN THE ARCTIC (PHASE 1) 42
(2011), https://pame.is/index.php/document-library/shipping-documents/heavyfuel-oil-documents/359-hfo-in-the-arctic-phase-i/file [https://perma.cc/9DCTZK3K].
75 See generally BERING SEA RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 25, at 51-54.
76 See id. at 37 (noting that persistent oil remains in the environment for a longer
period of time “and thus has the potential to impact biological receptors over a
longer time than non-persistent oil”).
77 Id. at 53.
67
68
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these include vessels serving Red Dog mine near Kivalina and
tankers delivering fuel products to the region. 78
Some of the tankers delivering fuel to the region represent a
particular threat because they transfer their fuel at sea. These large
tankers sit so deep in the water that they cannot deliver their cargo
directly to communities. Instead, fuels from these deep-draft tankers
must be transferred, on open water, into smaller barges that can
access shallow ports and beaches in Arctic communities. 79 This
process of at-sea fuel transfer is known as “lightering” or “ship-toship transfer.”80 Due to the presence of large volumes of oil in one
place at one time, 81 as well as the inherent risk of transferring oil at
sea, lightering represents a significant oil spill risk in the region.
There have been no reported lightering spills off the coast of
Alaska,82 but oil spills related to lightering have been documented
in other regions, and the impacts were significant. 83
3.

Discharges from Vessels Pollute Arctic Waters

In addition to the risk of accidental oil spills, more vessel
traffic will likely lead to the discharge of additional pollutants into
Arctic waters. Vessel discharge is governed by rules at the state,
national, and international level. 84 These laws prevent or
Id. at 54.
OVERVIEW OF TANKER LIGHTERING, supra note 24, at 2-3.
80 Id. at 1.
81 See id. at 3 (noting the use of large tankers “means that larger volumes of fuel
may be transported in one place at one time,” even if the overall volume of fuel
delivered to the region remains relatively stable).
82 Id. at 19.
83 See id. (describing spill of heavy fuel oil during a fuel transfer operation in
San Francisco Bay that impacted ten miles of shoreline, closed fisheries and
beaches, and resulted in an $850,000 natural resources damage assessment).
84 See, e.g., Melissa Parks et al., Quantifying and mitigating three major vessel
waste streams in the northern Bering Sea, 106 MARINE POLICY 1, 8 (2019)
(noting international, national, and state level options for area-based mitigation
measures to reduce discharge), available at
https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S0308597X18308315?token=B5CFC92
78
79
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significantly restrict ships from discharging many types of
pollutants, such as oil and oil mixtures and noxious liquids and
chemicals.85 However, there are more lenient restrictions on the
intentional discharge of sewage, 86 and even fewer restrictions on the
intentional discharge of graywater (i.e., drainage water from
showers, dishwashers, sinks, laundry machines, and similar
facilities).87
Discharge of untreated sewage and graywater can spread
bacteria or viruses,88 which can lead to illness in people who
consume marine-based foods.89 This is particularly problematic in
the Arctic, where fish and marine mammals often constitute a
significant part of the diet for many people. 90 Importantly, graywater
is not necessarily “cleaner” than sewage; concentrations of fecal
coliform in untreated vessel graywater can be up to several orders
70945ED9C4A5B69B5574668940272C1B29B40795062BFC7620C622917253
856A6C164E694F2DD317D7F9BC404 [https://perma.cc/M73H-RS8U].
85 See, e.g., Int’l Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as
amended by Protocol of 1978, Annexes I, II, & III (Feb. 16, 1978) [hereinafter
MARPOL].
86 Int’l Maritime Org., Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from Ships (undated),
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/Sewage/Pag
es/Default.aspx, [https://perma.cc/ZNW7-2DMY] (describing international
standard that allows ships to discharge raw sewage so long as the discharge
occurs at a distance of at least twelve nautical miles from shore and traveling at
least four knots).
87 See, e.g., Parks et al., supra note 84, at 4–6 (noting that IMO instruments such
as MARPOL and the Polar Code do not “specifically address grey water or
restrict its discharge”).
88 See, id. at 4 (noting fecal coliform from discharged sewage presents an
ecosystem risk; also noting that graywater contains fecal coliform
concentrations similar to those found in raw sewage); see also Envtl. Prot.
Agency, CRUISE SHIP DISCHARGE ASSESSMENT REPORT SECTION 3:
GRAYWATER 3-6 (2008) (noting presence of pathogens in untreated graywater
samples) (hereinafter CRUISE SHIP DISCHARGE REPORT).
89 See, Parks et al., supra note 84, at 4 (noting that “[s]hellfish can concentrate
fecal coliform and associated pathogens from the water around them, which can
be passed to humans”).
90 See, e.g., Oceana & Kawerak, Inc., supra note 5, at 18–22 (describing the
importance of subsistence foods to Indigenous people of the Bering Strait
region).
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of magnitude higher than untreated domestic wastewater. 91
Discharges of sewage and graywater can also lead to oxygen
depletion and can increase nutrient levels, possibly contributing to
toxic algal blooms and eutrophication, the effects of which can
ripple through marine food webs.92
Discharge of sewage and graywater from large passenger
vessels is a special concern. 93 Large passenger ships, such as cruise
ships, discharge significant volumes of sewage and graywater,
averaging nearly 8.5 gallons per day per person for sewage and
between forty-five and sixty-five gallons per day per person for
graywater.94 With cruise vessel tourism expected to increase
significantly in polar waters, discharges from cruise ships and other
large passenger vessels are a significant threat to the Arctic marine
environment.95 Even if stronger restrictions on discharge are
imposed, enforcement will be critical: some cruise companies have
a well-documented record of noncompliance with anti-pollution
regulations.96
CRUISE SHIP DISCHARGE REPORT, supra note 88, at 3-6.
Id. at 2-33, 3-27.
93 See Parks et al., supra note 84, at 4 (noting that “passenger vessels carry
significantly more people and generate more sewage and grey water than . . .
other vessel types”).
94CRUISE SHIP DISCHARGE REPORT, supra note 88, at 2-2, Figure 2.1 and 3-3.
95 See, e.g., Ahmasuk, Austin, Local Concerns of Opening the Arctic and the
Crystal Serenity, OCEAN CURRENTS: OCEAN CONSERVANCY BLOG (Sept. 8,
2016), https://oceanconservancy.org/blog/2016/09/08/local-concerns-ofopening-the-arctic-and-the-crystal-serenity/ [https://perma.cc/N8G3-HAJ4].
96 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Princess Cruise Lines
to Pay Largest-Ever Criminal Penalty for Deliberate Vessel Pollution:
Company to Pay $40 Million and Implement Remedial Measures on All
Carnival Companies Visiting U.S. Ports (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/princess-cruise-lines-pay-largest-ever-criminalpenalty-deliberate-vessel-pollution, [https://perma.cc/MKH6-TLH8] (noting that
the “Carnival family of companies has a documented history of environmental
violations”); see also, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Princess
Cruise Lines and its Parent Company Plead Guilty to Environmental Probation
Violations, Ordered to Pay $20 Million Criminal Penalty (June 3, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/princess-cruise-lines-and-its-parent-company91
92
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Emissions from Vessels Adversely Affect Arctic Air Quality
and Contribute to Global Warming

Increased vessel traffic also presents risks from emissions
into the air. Most vessels are powered by engines that run on fossil
fuels including heavy fuel oil, distillates, or fuel blends. Combustion
of these fuels emits pollutants that contribute to climate change. In
addition to emitting carbon dioxide, ships’ engines produce
particulate matter including black carbon. Black carbon has
significant climate forcing impacts. 97 In the Arctic, black carbon is
deposited on ice and snow where it decreases reflectivity, increases
heat absorption, and accelerates melting. 98 Although black carbon
does not persist in the atmosphere as long as carbon dioxide, it is the
second-biggest contributor to anthropogenic climate change after
carbon dioxide.99 Ships also emit sulfur and nitrogen oxides, which
plead-guilty-environmental-probation-violations, [https://perma.cc/5F58-6GMS]
(noting violations of probation); Taylor Dolven, Federal judge threatens to
temporarily block Carnival ships from docking at U.S. ports, MIAMI HERALD
(Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/tourismcruises/article229069589.html (noting that one of Carnival Cruise lines’ ships
illegally dumped graywater in Glacier Bay National Park in Alaska).
97 See, e.g., Climate risks from CO2 and short-lived climate pollutants, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., (undated), https://www.who.int/sustainabledevelopment/housing/health-risks/climate-pollutants/en/,
[https://perma.cc/PA8N-D68K] (noting that black carbon, while short-lived in
the atmosphere, “has hundreds to thousands of times more warming potential
than carbon dioxide.”).
98 See, e.g., P.K. Quinn et al., The Impact of Black Carbon on Arctic Climate,
ARCTIC MONITORING & ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, 45–49 (2011),
https://www.amap.no/documents/download/977/inline.
99 See T.C. Bond et al., Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system:
A scientific assessment, 118 J. of Geophysical Res.: Atmospheres, 5380, 5381
(2013) (“We estimate that black carbon . . . is the second most important human
emission in terms of its climate forcing in the present-day atmosphere; only
carbon
dioxide is estimated to have a greater forcing.”),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312193003_Bounding_the_role_of_bl
ack_carbon_in_the_climate_system_-_A_scientific_assessment
[https://perma.cc/6ZXL-CEPU].
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can have adverse impacts on human health. 100 Ships that burn heavy
fuel oil tend to produce even “dirtier” exhaust because contaminants
in the fuel—such as ash, sulfur, vanadium, aluminum, silicon,
sodium, sediment, and asphaltenes—negatively affect the
composition of exhaust.101
Arctic shipping emissions have direct consequences on
human health and the environment in the Arctic and contribute
significantly to global emissions and climate change. Global
shipping traffic is responsible for roughly 2.2% of global carbon
dioxide emissions.102 If the shipping industry were a country, its
worldwide emissions would rank approximately sixth, falling
between Germany and Japan. 103 Experts predict that on a businessas-usual pathway, total shipping emissions could reach 17% of
worldwide greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.104

Airclim et al., AIR POLLUTION FROM SHIPS 3 (2011),
http://www.cleanshipping.org/download/111128_Air%20pollution%20from%20
ships_New_Nov-11(3).pdf [https://perma.cc/5546-6UKQ]
101 Vard Marine, FUEL ALTERNATIVES FOR ARCTIC SHIPPING 10-11 (2015),
http://awsassets.wwf.ca/downloads/vard_313_000_01_fuel_alternatives_letter_f
inal.pdf
102 Int’l Maritime Org., THIRD IMO GREENHOUSE GAS STUDY 2014, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 1 (2014),
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution
/Documents/Third%20Greenhouse%20Gas%20Study/GHG3%20Executive%20
Summary%20and%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HFE6-3A96].
103 Zoe Schlanger, Smoggy Seas: If shipping were a country, it would be the
world’s sixth-biggest greenhouse gas emitter, QUARTZ (April 17, 2018),
https://qz.com/1253874/if-shipping-were-a-country-it-would-the-worlds-sixthbiggest-greenhouse-gas-emitter/, [https://perma.cc/NRB2-WKT9]
104 See European Parliament Directorate-Gen. for Internal Policies, Emission
Reduction Targets for International Aviation and Shipping 28 (2015),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/569964/IPOL_STU
(2015)569964_EN.pdf, [https://perma.cc/42BF-LHKT] (explaining that “if
action to combat climate change is further postponed,” the maritime transport
sector’s contribution to global carbon dioxide emissions may reach 17% by
2050).
100
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Additional Subsea Noise from Vessels May Adversely Affect
Marine Animals and Subsistence Hunting

Increasing vessel traffic generally leads to more noise in the
ocean, which can have serious impacts on marine mammals and fish.
In the water, low-frequency sound energy—like that used by baleen
whales—travels faster and further than light energy 105 and can easily
travel long distances and cross maritime jurisdictional borders. 106
Researchers documented changes to humpback whale vocalizations
in response to anthropogenic sound sources roughly 200 kilometers
away.107 In the past, Arctic waters have been relatively free of
anthropogenic noise. In recent years, however, the Arctic is
experiencing more underwater noise caused by vessel traffic as well
as military sonar, seismic exploration for oil and gas, and resource
extraction.108 With respect to vessel traffic, icebreakers tend to
produce louder and more varied sounds than other vessels.109
Increased noise in the subsea environment may adversely
affect marine mammals, which use sound to communicate, avoid
predators, and navigate their environment. 110 Anthropogenic noise
can disturb important behaviors like feeding, breeding, resting, or
migration.111 Exposure to low-frequency sound “may be associated

ROBERT J. URICK, PRINCIPLES OF UNDERWATER SOUND 1 (3rd ed. 1983).
See, e.g., Sue E. Moore et al., A new framework for assessing the effects of
anthropogenic sound on marine mammals in a rapidly changing Arctic, 62
Bioscience 289, 290 (2012) (noting sound from seismic surveys has been
detected thousands of kilometers from its source).
107 Denise Risch et al., Changes in Humpback Whale Song Occurrence in
Response to an Acoustic Source 200km Away, 7 PLoSONE e29741,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3256173/pdf/pone.0029741.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CT44-95QT].
108 Sue E. Moore et al., supra note 106, at 289-292.
109 AMSA 2009, supra note 60, at 146.
110 Moore et al., supra note 106, at 290.
111 Id.
105
106
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with chronic stress in whales,” 112 and human-caused noise may
reduce the availability of prey species.113 Emerging evidence
suggests that subsea noise may adversely affect fish, squid, and
other marine animals. 114 To the extent that marine mammals are
adversely affected by underwater noise, opportunities for
subsistence hunting may also be adversely affected. For instance,
sound from vessels may cause marine mammals to divert from their
usual migration pathways, which could make hunting those animals
more difficult or dangerous. 115
6.

Increased Ship Traffic May Increase Ship Strikes

In the Arctic, ships share the water with marine mammals
including large whales, creating the potential for ship strikes that can
injure or kill these whales. 116 The Bering Strait region could be an
especially important region in this regard, because the strait is
relatively narrow and the fall migration of whales overlaps with
periods of higher vessel traffic in this narrow passage.117 Many

Rosalind M. Rolland et al., Evidence that ship noise increases stress in right
whales, 279 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B 2363, 2365–67 (2012),
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rspb.2011.2429
[https://perma.cc/KMS7-GPZP].
113 Moore et al., supra note 106, at 290.
114 J. Gedamke et al., Ocean Noise Strategy Roadmap, NOAA 99–102 (2016),
https://cetsound.noaa.gov/Assets/cetsound/documents/Roadmap/ONS_Roadmap
_Final_Complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C3Y-LC2G].
115 Huntington et al., Vessels, risks and rules: planning for safe shipping in the
Bering Strait, 51 MARINE POLICY 119, 122 (2015). See also Hannah Hoag, Inuit
concerns stall seismic testing: Research in Canadian waters halted over fears it
could harm wildlife, NATURE (Aug. 12, 2010) (describing how Inuit group
concerns that seismic testing could “disturb narwhals, beluga, walrus, seals and
polar bears in Lancaster Sound”),
https://www.nature.com/news/2010/100812/full/news.2010.403.html
[https://perma.cc/X265-FGAV].
116 Huntington et al., supra note 115, at 121.
117 Id.
112
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species of large whales are susceptible to ship strikes 118 and in this
region, bowhead whales may be most vulnerable. 119 In addition to
whale mortality from ship strikes, some observers have raised the
concern that a large vessel could strike subsistence hunters in small
skiffs.120
7.

Additional Vessel Traffic Creates More Pathways for
Marine Invasive Species

Ship traffic is a major contributor to the spread of invasive
species—organisms introduced by human activity into an
environment outside of their natural range and that spread to have
negative impacts on the local ecosystem. 121 Ships may spread nonnative species when they take on ballast water containing marine
organisms in one location and discharge that ballast water and its
associated marine organisms in another location. 122 Ships may also
spread non-native species when those species attach themselves to
See, e.g., David W. Laist et al., Collisions Between Ships and Whales, 17
MARINE MAMMAL SCI. 35, 39 (2001) (finding evidence of ship strikes among
eleven species of great whales).
119 Huntington et al., supra note 115, at 121. See also AMSA 2009, supra note
57, at 108 (listing ship strikes as a potential conflict between increasing vessel
traffic and indigenous marine resource use in the Bering Strait region).
120 See id. at 122 (noting that Indigenous hunters travel as much as 100 miles
from shore in small open boats that “could be struck by a large vessel or
swamped by a large vessel's wake,” and that “[g]iven the cold water and
distance from land and assistance in the Bering Strait region, such incidents
would likely be fatal to those on the small boat, if the large vessel were unaware
of the accident.”).
121 Biofouling, INT’L MARITIME ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Biofouling/Pages/default.aspx,
[https://perma.cc/B226-QRZQ] (“The problem of invasive species carried by
ships has intensified over the last few decades due to the expanded trade and
traffic volume and, since the volumes of seaborne trade continue to increase, the
problem may not yet have reached its peak.”). See also Invasive Species, IUCN,
https://www.iucn.org/theme/species/our-work/invasive-species/,
[https://perma.cc/HS66-LRN6] (defining invasive species).
122 Ballast Water Management, INT’L MARITIME ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/BallastWaterManagement/Pages/
Default.aspx, [https://perma.cc/6AGV-DKXX].
118
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the outside of a vessel in one location and are carried by the ship to
another location (“hull-fouling” or “biofouling”).123 Invasive
species can transform marine habitats and cause significant
economic impacts, including diminishing fisheries.124 Once
invasive species are established in marine habitats, “it can be nearly
impossible to eliminate them.”125 Modelers predict Arctic waters
will have the largest rate of species invasion, with a modeled
invasion intensity of nearly five and a half times the global marine
average.126 Researchers posited that relatively “low initial species
richness” in the Arctic led to “high biodiversity impact” in polar
regions.127 With respect to invasive species transmitted by vessels,
risk is highest where ships travel routes that join seas with similar
environments, such as the Northern Sea Route, which connects the
North Pacific and the North Atlantic. 128
IV. STEPS FORWARD: ADVANCES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF
ARCTIC VESSEL TRAFFIC SINCE 2012
Stakeholders and regulators have already taken important
steps to mitigate threats posed by increasing vessel traffic in the
Int’l Maritime Org., Biofouling,
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Biofouling/Pages/default.aspx
(last visited Nov. 1, 2019) [https://perma.cc/B226-QRZQ].
124 Jennifer L. Molnar, Rebecca Gamboa, Carmen Revenga & Mark Spaulding,
Assessing the global threat of invasive species to marine biodiversity, 6
FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & THE ENV’T, 485, 485 (2008),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d0be/4fa91c637e06175f158251f11837e4a40cfa
.pdf [https://perma.cc/VNL3-ZVVM].
125 Id. at 485.
126 William W.L. Cheung, Vicky W. Y. Lam, Jorge L. Sarmiento, Kelly
Kearney, Reg Watson & Daniel Pauly, Projecting global marine biodiversity
impacts under climate change scenarios, 10 FISH & FISHERIES 235, 243 (2009).
127 Id. at 243.
128 Chris Ware Jørgen Berge, Anders Jelmert, Steffen M. Olsen, Loïc Pelliser,
Mary Wisz, Darren Kriticos, Georgy Semenov, Slowomir Kwashieski & Inger
G. Alsos, Biological introduction risks from shipping in a warming Arctic, 53 J.
OF APPLIED ECOLOGY 340, 347 (2015),
https://besjournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1365-2664.12566
[https://perma.cc/LX8R-T5HG].
123
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Arctic. The following section summarizes measures, implemented
since 2012, intended to increase safety and reduce environmental
impacts associated with vessel traffic in Arctic waters. It also
discusses additional mitigation measures under active consideration
and in one case, a suite of measures that was rescinded before it
could be implemented.
A.

The International Maritime Organization Adopted a
New Polar Code

One of the biggest developments in Arctic shipping
regulation since 2012 has been implementation of the International
Maritime Organization’s (IMO) International Code for Ships
Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), which began in January
2017.129 The Polar Code establishes provisions designed to increase
safety and reduce environmental impacts of ship traffic in highlatitude waters, including Arctic waters. Like other IMO
conventions, the Polar Code is enforced by individual nations,
including the nation under which a vessel is registered (i.e., the “flag
state”) and nations where the vessel makes port calls (via “port-state
control”). Various parts of the shipping industry itself—including
insurance providers and classification societies—also help enforce
the Polar Code and other IMO mitigation measures.
The Polar Code’s environmental provisions include
pollution restrictions above and beyond those that apply in nonpolar waters. These include additional restrictions on the discharge
of oil, noxious liquid substances, harmful substances, sewage, and
garbage.130 Likewise, the Polar Code’s safety provisions include
Int’l Maritime Org., Shipping in polar waters—Adoption of an international
code for safety for ships operating in polar waters (Polar Code),
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx,
[https://perma.cc/UYF7-3NNG] (last visited Nov. 1 2019) (noting Polar Code
entered into force January 1, 2017).
130 Int’l Maritime Org., International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters,
part II-A, ch. 1–5, MEPC 68/21/Add.1 (Nov. 21, 2014)
129
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special requirements related to ship design and construction,
equipment, operating and training requirements, communications,
voyage planning, and other elements designed to improve safety of
vessels in high-latitude waters.131 Sometimes safety and
environmental protection measures blend together. For example,
voyage planning provisions are categorized under safety, but require
mariners to consider information that could help minimize impacts
to marine mammals, such as location of marine mammal
aggregation and seasonal migration areas. 132 Mariners and other
stakeholders are working to determine how best to apply these
mandatory marine mammal voyage planning provisions in U.S.
Arctic waters.
Adoption of the Polar Code was a significant step forward,
but it did not resolve all challenges related to vessel traffic in highlatitude waters. The Polar Code’s safety provisions, for example, do
not apply to fishing vessels, smaller cargo ships, pleasure yachts,
military vessels and other less common vessel types. 133 Its
environmental provisions do not regulate discharge of graywater
and do not prohibit use or carriage for use of heavy fuel oil in Arctic

http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Documents/POLAR%20C
ODE%20TEXT%20AS%20ADOPTED.pdf, [https://perma.cc/57Z4WFD6](hereinafter Polar Code).
131 Id. at part I-A; ch. 1–12,
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Documents/POLAR%20C
ODE%20TEXT%20AS%20ADOPTED.pdf.[ https://perma.cc/57Z4-WFD6],\.
132 Id. at part I-A, ch. 11.3.6.
133 The Polar Code’s safety provisions apply only to vessels subject to the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). See DNV-GL,
The IMO Polar Code in force, beginning 1 January 2017: How to comply (Dec.
21, 2016), https://www.dnvgl.com/news/the-imo-polar-code-in-force-beginning1-january-2017-how-to-comply-83230, [https://perma.cc/D3Y2-J7V5]. SOLAS
does not apply to certain types of smaller vessels. International Martime
Organization, Int’l Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (as amended)
(SOLAS), Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1226, Ch. 1 Part A, Reg. 3 (listing vessels
to which SOLAS does not apply).
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waters.134 The Polar Code does little to address impacts from vesselrelated noise or the threat of invasive species in Arctic waters. While
it sets forth broad management measures for polar waters, it does
not impose granular area-based management measures such as
specific vessel routing measures or specific areas where discharges
or emissions should be subject to more stringent regulations. In
short, while adoption of the Polar Code was a positive development,
it is not the final word on management of vessel traffic in Arctic
waters.
B.

IMO Approved New Areas to be Avoided and Traffic
Routes Around the Aleutian Islands and in the Bering
Strait, and Additional Measures are Under
Consideration

In U.S. Arctic waters, several routing measures have been
implemented since 2012 and others are underway. Routing
measures include, among other things, different types of formal
vessel traffic lanes as well as “Areas to be Avoided” (ATBAs). As
the name implies, ATBA designation encourages vessels to steer
clear of defined areas to avoid navigational hazards or to safeguard
environmentally sensitive areas. 135

The Polar Code encourages mariners to discontinue use of heavy fuel oil in
the Arctic but does not require them to do so. See Polar Code, Part II-B, Ch. 1.1.
135 Int’l Maritime Org., General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing, § 2.1.12
(defining “area to be avoided” as “a routeing measure comprising an area within
defined limits in which either navigation is particularly hazardous or it is
exceptionally important to avoid casualties and which should be avoided by all
ships, or certain classes of ship”). See also Int’l Maritime Org., Guidance Note
on the Preparation of Proposals on Ships’ Routeing Systems and Ship Reporting
Systems for Submission to the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation, § 1.2
(2003) (noting that ships routeing measures may be used to “increase the
protection of the marine environment”),
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Documents/Ships'%20route
ing/MSC.1-Circ.1060-asAmended-consolidatedGuidance%20Note%20on%20the%20Preparation%20of%20Proposals%20onSh
ipsRouteingReporting.pdf, [https://perma.cc/363R-W8JF].
134

2020]

Safety Measures in the Bering Strait Region

93

Waters surrounding the Aleutian Islands—in the southern
Bering Sea and North Pacific—were the first in the U.S. Arctic to
benefit from routing measures. The IMO approved five ATBAs in
the region, which took effect at the beginning of 2016.136 After
establishment of the five ATBAs in waters surrounding the Aleutian
Islands, attention turned to the Bering Strait region.
In 2010, the U.S. Coast Guard embarked on a maritime
planning process, called a Port Access Route Study (PARS), to
determine whether the Bering Strait region might benefit from
formal vessel traffic lanes.137 Toward the conclusion of that process
in 2016, the Coast Guard recommended designating formal vessel
traffic lanes and specific ATBAs in the region. 138 In 2018, those
recommendations bore fruit when the IMO approved a joint
proposal from the United States and Russia to designate
recommendatory two-way vessel routes that extend well south, and
slightly north, of the Bering Strait itself. 139 The routes are safe for
North of England P&I Assn., Ltd., USA: IMO Adopt the Establishment of five
‘Areas to Be Avoided’ (ATBA) in the Aleutian Islands (June 25, 2015),
http://www.nepia.com/insights/industry-news/usa-imo-adopt-the-establishmentof-five-%E2%80%98areas-to-be-avoided%E2%80%99-(atba)-in-the-aleutianislands/, [https://perma.cc/F5XG-Y6Y3]. See also Int’l Maritime Org., Subcommittee on Navigation, Communication and Search and Rescue, Routeing
Measures and Mandatory Ship Reporting Systems: Establishment of five areas
to be avoided in the region of the Aleutian Islands, Submitted by the United
States (Dec. 5, 2014) (describing U.S. proposal for Aleutian Island areas to be
avoided), http://www.nepia.com/media/258601/IMO-NCSR-2-3-5-Adopt-theEstablishment-of-Five-Areas-to-be-Avoided.pdf, [https://perma.cc/K3M8KFNB].
137 See generally, U.S. Coast Guard, Port Access Route Study: In the Bering
Strait, 75 Fed. Reg. 68, 568 (Nov. 8, 2010) (announcing vessel routing study for
the Bering Strait region and requesting public comment).
138 U.S. Coast Guard, Preliminary Findings: Port Access Route Study: In the
Chukchi Sea, Bering Strait, and Bering Sea, 22-36 (Dec. 23, 2017),
https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/PARS/Bering_Strait_PARS_General.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/MD6B-89BY] (hereinafter Preliminary Findings).
139 The Maritime Executive, IMO Authorizes New Bering Sea Routing (May 26,
2018), https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/imo-authorizes-new-bering136
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all types of vessels and are designed to keep ships away from
potentially hazardous coastlines and shoaling waters. 140
Encouraging ships to follow these routes improves predictability
and safety and enhances environmental protection. 141 In addition to
the establishment of these two-way routes, the IMO also designated
three ATBAs in the Bering Strait region in 2018; one each around
St. Lawrence, Nunavik, and King islands. 142 The United States
proposed these Bering Strait-region ATBAs to help improve
shipping safety, protect the marine environment, and safeguard
subsistence activities. 143
Beyond the ATBAs designated in 2018, officials from the
United States and Russia have discussed the potential for the two
countries to jointly propose a transboundary ATBA designed to
improve safety and protect waters around Big and Little Diomede
sea-routing, [https://perma.cc/76YE-QKHQ]. See also Int’l Maritime Org. Subcommittee on Navigation, Communication and Search and Rescue, Routeing
Measures and Mandatory Ship Reporting Systems: Establishment of two-way
routes and precautionary areas in the Bering Sea and Bering Strait, Submitted
by the Russian Federation and the United States §§ 3.5 & 8.5 (Nov. 17, 2017)
(describing joint U.S. and Russian proposal for vessel traffic lanes),
https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/IMO/NCSR_5_3_7.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/Q6WJ-EC7X].
140 Id.
141 Id. at § 3.
142 See Int’l Maritime Org., Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and
Search and Rescue (NCSR), 5th session, February 19-23, 2018, (Feb. 23, 2018),
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/NCSR/Pages/NCSR5.a
spx, [https://perma.cc/D6GA-VQ3Q] (noting subcommittee’s agreement to
“establish three areas to be avoided in the Bering Sea, proposed by the United
States, to improve safety of navigation and protect the fragile and unique
environment”). The United States originally proposed a substantially bigger
ATBA that would have encompassed a large area south of St. Lawrence Island.
The IMO subcommittee that evaluated the proposal opted not to include these
southern waters when it approved the St. Lawrence Island ATBA because some
subcommittee members felt that it was inappropriate to designate such a large
area in the absence of more direct concerns about navigation and ship safety.
143 Henry Huntington et al., The role of areas to be avoided in the governance of
shipping in the greater Bering Strait region, MARINE POLICY § 4.3 (May 2019),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103564, [https://perma.cc/VR35-WLZ6].
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Islands, which are located in the middle of the Bering Strait. 144 Big
Diomede Island is part of Russia and Little Diomede Island is part
of the United States. The United States Coast Guard went as far as
recommending designation of an ATBA around Little Diomede
Island in 2016.145 However, instead of moving forward with a
unilateral proposal at the IMO, the United States opted to explore
the potential of a joint Russian/U.S. ATBA that would surround both
Diomede Islands. As of this writing, discussions between the U.S.
and Russia are still ongoing.
In late 2018, the U.S. Coast Guard announced the start of a
new PARS for the Alaskan Arctic Coast, covering U.S. portions of
the Chukchi and Beaufort seas.146 In undertaking the study, the
Coast Guard plans to “analyze current vessel patterns, predict future
vessel needs and balance the needs of all waterway users by
developing and recommending vessel routing measures for the
Arctic coast.”147 While the Coast Guard expects to take more than
four years to complete the Alaskan Arctic Coast PARS,148 the
process could eventually lead to the creation of ATBAs adjacent to
the Chukchi and Beaufort Sea coasts, designated traffic lanes to
guide large vessels as they pass through the region, and/or additional
mitigation measures designed to increase safety and minimize
impacts to the marine ecosystem and subsistence hunting. 149 The
PARS process gives Indigenous residents of Arctic communities
and other stakeholders an opportunity to contribute input that may
help shape the study and any recommended outcomes.150
Id. at 6.
Preliminary Findings, supra note 138, at 22, 30-31.
146 Port Access Route Study: Alaskan Arctic Coast, 83 Fed. Reg. 65,701, 65,701
(Dec. 21, 2018).
147 Id. at 65,702.
148 Id.
149 See id. (noting that the Coast Guard is undertaking the study in part to
develop and recommend vessel routing measures for the Arctic coast).
150 See id. at 65,701 (requesting public comment) and 65,702 (noting that the
study may take more than four years in part because of challenges related to
144
145
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Stakeholders Formed New Non-Regulatory Bodies,
Including the Best Practices Information Forum and
Two Waterways Safety Councils

Over the past five years, maritime stakeholders established
new voluntary, non-regulatory bodies to gather and disseminate
information related to shipping in Arctic waters which have
relevance to the Bering Strait. These new bodies include the Arctic
Shipping Best Practices Information Forum, the Arctic Waterways
Safety Committee, and the Aleutian Island Waterways Safety
Committee.
The Arctic Shipping Best Practices Information Forum was
formed in 2017 in an effort to help implement the Polar Code.151 The
Forum is designed to heighten awareness of Polar Code provisions
among those mariners who operate in Arctic waters, as well as
others who may be affected by maritime operations in the Arctic. 152
The Forum also works to promote “the exchange of information and
best practices between the Forum participants on specific shipping
topics, including but not limited to; hydrography, search and rescue
logistics, industry guidelines and ship equipment, systems and
structure.”153 The Best Practices Information Forum developed as a
project of the Arctic Council’s Protection of the Arctic Marine
Environment (PAME) working group. Participation in the Forum “is
open to Arctic States, Permanent Participants and Arctic Council
Observers,” as well as other professional organizations that have
“accessing and communicating with regional stakeholders at times when
discussions will be most productive.”).
151 Prot. of the Arctic Marine Env’t Working Grp., The Arctic Shipping Best
Practice Information Forum (undated),
https://www.pame.is/index.php/projects/arctic-marine-shipping/the-arcticshipping-best-practices-information-forum (last visited Aug. 27, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/NP6A-HH7X].
152 Id.
153 Id.

2020]

Safety Measures in the Bering Strait Region

97

relevant expertise and experience and that work to promote shipping
safety and protection of the marine environment in the Arctic. 154 To
date, the Forum has served primarily as a venue for information
sharing; in the future, it may evolve to serve additional functions.
In addition to the Arctic Shipping Best Practices Information
Forum, which covers the global Arctic, maritime users have
established two voluntary, multi-stakeholder groups that focus on
waters off the coast of Alaska. The Arctic Waterway Safety
Committee was established in 2014 and covers U.S. portions of the
Beaufort and Chukchi seas, as well as the Bering Strait and northern
Bering Sea.155 The Aleutian Islands Waterways Safety Committee
was established in 2017 and covers U.S. waters around the Aleutian
Islands chain and the southern portion of the Bering Sea, including
waters around the Pribilof Islands. 156 The two committees are
modeled after Harbor Safety Committees that operate in various
marine areas in the lower 48 states. 157 They facilitate exchange of
information and establishment and dissemination of best practices
and standards of care relevant to their regions. This is in an effort to
promote safety, protect the marine environment, and reduce
conflicts among maritime users.158 While the two committees are
Id.
Our Work, ARCTIC WATERWAYS SAFETY COMM.,
http://www.arcticwaterways.org/attorneys-1.html [https://perma.cc/FX9LPTLR].
156 About, ALEUTIAN ISLANDS WATERWAYS SAFETY COMM.
157 See generally U.S. Coast Guard, NAVIGATION AND VESSEL INSPECTION
CIRCULAR NO. 1-00: GUIDANCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
OF HARBOR SAFETY COMMITTEES UNDER THE MARINE TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEM (MTS) INITIATIVE (undated), (describing Harbor Safety Committees).
158 See Our Work, ARCTIC WATERWAYS SAFETY COMM.,
http://www.arcticwaterways.org/attorneys-1.html, [https://perma.cc/FX9LPTLR]. (describing mission of Arctic Waterways Safety Committee); see also
Aleutian Islands Waterways Safety Comm., ALEUTIAN ISLANDS WATERWAYS
SAFETY PLAN 5 (May 2019),
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/cd25fe_0f4f7dff15fb429c8b26dd4456d3f05b.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SXW7-A7UH] (describing purpose and mission of Aleutian
Islands Waterways Safety Committee).
154
155
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structured somewhat differently, both include members representing
a wide range of maritime sectors and stakeholders, including various
commercial shipping operators and subsistence or Alaska Native
interests.159 Representatives from federal, state and local agencies
participate in and support the work of both Committees.160
The two Alaskan waterways safety committees are forums
in which waterway users can identify concerns and work toward
collaborative, non-regulatory solutions. For instance, the Arctic
Waterways Safety Committee focused on reducing conflicts
between Indigenous hunters and researchers operating in Arctic
waters, eventually developing and adopting a standard of care for
research vessels. 161 While the research vessel standard of care is
non-binding, it has been adopted by at least some Arctic
researchers.162 The Aleutian Islands Waterways Safety Committee
recently developed and adopted a “Waterways Safety Plan” with
standards of care and protocols which “are intended to complement
and supplement federal, state and local law, regulations and
guidelines.”163

Membership, ARCTIC WATERWAYS SAFETY COMM.,
http://www.arcticwaterways.org/membership.html, [https://perma.cc/GC9ZDR7R]; see also Organization Framework & Biographies, ALEUTIAN ISLANDS
WATERWAYS SAFETY COMM., https://www.aleutianislandswsc.org/membershipframework, [https://perma.cc/KH7M-5MYU] (describing membership structure
of committees). Co-author Andrew Hartsig is a member of the Aleutian Island
Waterways Safety Committee representing conservation organizations.
160 Id.
161 See generally Arctic Waterways Safety Comm., WATERWAYS SAFETY PLAN
PART 3 (Dec. 5, 2018), http://www.arcticwaterways.org/safety-plan.html,
[https://perma.cc/R73M-T3YS].
162 Ian Evans, Avoiding Clashes Between Ocean Researchers and Indigenous
Communities, OCEANS DEEPLY (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.newsdeeply.com/oceans/community/2017/10/12/avoiding-clashesbetween-ocean-researchers-and-indigenous-communities,
[https://perma.cc/737Z-5YF6].
163 ALEUTIAN ISLANDS WATERWAYS SAFETY PLAN, supra note 155, at 5.
159
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While development of these two safety committees
represents a step forward, opportunities for improvements remain.
The structure of the Arctic Waterways Safety Committee, for
example, has been criticized for not adequately including Tribes,
and an important regional tribal organization recently withdrew
from participating in the Committee for this reason.164 As the
Committee continues to evolve, it should consider changing its
membership structure to ensure relevant Tribes are properly
represented.
D.

The Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area Was
Established – And Then Revoked

In 2016, after years of work by Indigenous communities,
President Obama signed an Executive Order creating the Northern
Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area (NBSCRA).165 The Executive
Order set aside the Northern Bering Sea region as a unique place,
home to rich peoples and cultures, and in need of a special
governance structure and protections. It created a mandate for
federal agencies working in the region to coordinate with one
another and to give attention to the “rights, needs and knowledge”
of Alaska Native Tribes in the region as well as the “delicate and
unique” ecosystem.166 It also created a Federal Bering Task Force to
facilitate coordination between federal agencies and a Bering Sea
Intergovernmental Tribal Advisory Council to provide input to the
Task Force on behalf of Alaska Native Tribes.167
The Executive Order contained specific directives aimed at
various industries that could adversely affect ecological values or
See Letter from Kawerak, Inc. to Willie Goodwin, Chairman, Arctic
Waterways Safety Committee (Jan. 23, 2019) (on file with author).
165 See generally Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience, Exec. Order No.
13754 of Dec. 9, 2016, 81 Fed. Reg. 90,669, 90,669–74 (Dec. 14, 2016).
166 Id. at 90,669.
167 Id. at 90,670–71.
164
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opportunities for subsistence hunting and fishing in the region.
These included a permanent withdrawal of the region from oil and
gas development168 and reinforcement of an existing fishing
measure that closes the region to bottom trawling. 169 The Executive
Order also required all federal agencies to consider traditional
knowledge in decision-making, and directed additional work to
address pollution from vessels, consider routing measures for ships,
and bolster oil spill preparedness. 170
President Trump revoked the Executive Order soon after he
took into office,171 so the Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience
Area no longer exists as such. It could, however, be reinstated and
still serves as a potential model for coordinated management that
includes a substantial role for Indigenous People.
V. LOOKING AHEAD: ADDITIONAL MANAGEMENT MEASURES ARE
NEEDED TO SAFEGUARD THE ARCTIC FROM THE IMPACTS OF
INCREASING VESSEL TRAFFIC AND RAPID CLIMATE CHANGE
As the foregoing sections show, there has been progress in
implementing regulations, adopting recommendatory measures, and
establishing forums designed to promote better vessel traffic
practices, both in Arctic waters broadly and in the U.S. Arctic and
Bering Strait region in particular. Although short-lived, the Northern
Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area was a notable attempt to
develop an entirely new governance structure that would address
concerns related to growing vessel traffic and impacts from other

Id. at 90,670.
Id. at 90,672
170 Id. at 90,671–72.
171 Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy, Exec. Order
13795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,816, 20,816–18 (May 3, 2017). President Trump’s
reversal of the Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area underscores the
vulnerability of executive orders, which are easily reversed by future Presidents.
The use of an Executive Order to create the Northern Bering Sea Climate
Resilience Area also highlights the lack of other mechanisms that could
accommodate the formation of this unique governance structure.
168
169
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sectors while amplifying the role Indigenous Peoples play in the
management of the Bering Strait region.
These have been significant steps forward, and we do not
intend to minimize their importance. At the same time, more must
be done to implement shipping measures that promote safety,
minimize conflicts with subsistence users, and reduce risk to the
marine environment. These necessary actions must occur in the
context of broader improvements in the management of Arctic
resources.
The following sections emphasize the need for holistic
management in the face of a rapidly changing climate; describe
more granular shipping-focused mitigation actions designed to
improve safety, reduce the threat of oil spills, decrease harmful
discharges, and reduce other vessel-related impacts to the Arctic
marine ecosystem; and examine opportunities to curb vessel
emissions in Arctic waters and beyond—for the benefit of the Arctic
marine ecosystem and the entire ocean.
A.

The Need for Holistic and Inclusive Governance in the
Arctic – and the Need to Look Beyond Arctic Shipping
to Address Global Climate Change

Thus far, this Article has focused on managing the risks of
increasing vessel traffic in U.S. Arctic waters. While the risks
associated with increasing vessel traffic are substantial on their own,
they exist in conjunction with profound and rapid climate change
and hazards associated with the expansion of other commercial
activities. These activities and changes necessitate holistic, inclusive
management for the region’s natural resources.
It is impossible to consider measures intended to address
threats posed by shipping in the Arctic without acknowledging the
broader context of climate change. As explained earlier, climate
change is having substantial and disproportionate impacts on Arctic
ecosystems and communities. Simply addressing emissions from
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shipping, while necessary, will be insufficient to address the global
problem. Rather, global action to reduce emissions is urgently
needed. The recent U.S. Climate Assessment172 and the IPCC 1.5°
report173 make clear that each sector that contributes to climate
change must do its part to drive systemic change. At a global scale,
all nations must work together to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Reducing or eliminating emissions from shipping must be part of
that action.
Moreover, changing climate and the growth in vessel traffic
will likely be accompanied by commercial fishing and offshore oil
and gas exploration expanding to new areas in the Arctic. Successful
management will require a comprehensive approach that
coordinates across a full range of uses, agencies, and stakeholders.
Currently, more than twenty federal agencies have management
responsibilities in the Arctic. 174 Sovereign tribal governments, state
and municipal governments and other tribal organizations, including
co-management bodies, have governance responsibilities, and many
other commercial, recreational, and conservation stakeholders have
a stake in the region as well. 175
This siloed management is ineffective and often results in
analyses that fail to consider potential cumulative impacts of
commercial and industrial uses—together with climate change—in
a comprehensive way. 176 An integrated approach is needed to
See generally U.S. Global Change Res. Program, FOURTH NATIONAL
CLIMATE ASSESSMENT VOLS. I & II (NCA4) (2018).
173 See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, SPECIAL REPORT:
GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C. (2018).
174 Joel Clement et. al., MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING
ARCTIC: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, 32 (2013),
https://www.afsc.noaa.gov/publications/misc_pdf/iamreport.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/S7C9-DUTV].
175 Id. at 1.
176 Id. at 38 (noting the “largely balkanized management system for the Arctic”
is straining to cope with a rapidly changing region and growing “economic,
environmental, cultural, and social expectations.”).
172
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improve efficiencies, work across jurisdictional boundaries, and
consider and manage for cumulative impacts across uses.177
In developing comprehensive management for the region,
Tribes must have meaningful involvement in decision-making.178
Bering Strait region “[T]ribes have a strong desire to be direct
participants in the design, justification and implementation of
protections.”179 However, there is currently no formal role in
management, either domestically or at the IMO, for Tribes. 180
Utilizing Traditional Knowledge in management decisions is also
key, and provides a wealth of information. According to Julie
Raymond-Yakoubian, a social scientist with Kawerak, Inc. and a
leading scholar on the co-production of knowledge:
If indigenous communities are consulted and
included in decision-making this vast body of
Traditional Knowledge will be accessible and can be
used to formulate effective monitoring and
management of vessel traffic and other activities in
the region. Indigenous communities must be
meaningfully and equitably involved in order for this
to be successful.181
As noted above, the NBSCRA offered one potential model
for an inclusive and coordinated governance structure for the region
that includes a meaningful role for Tribes. While the Executive
Order did not do everything the Tribes requested, it was a significant
Id. at 2-3.
Arctic Vessel Traffic and Indigenous Communities, supra note 9, at 290–91.
179 Conceptual and institutional Frameworks, supra note 8, at 97–98.
180 See Levon Sevunts, World maritime body presents Polar Code to Arctic
Council meeting in Alaska, RADIO CANADA INTERNATIONAL (March 10, 2017),
http://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2017/03/10/world-maritime-bodypresents-polar-code-to-arctic-council-meeting-in-alaska/,
[https://perma.cc/6L9J-ZJ7X].
181 Arctic Vessel Traffic and Indigenous Communities, supra note 9, at 292.
177
178
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step forward for coordinated management with a role for Tribes and
serves as an example of what a coordinated, inclusive management
structure might look like in the Bering Strait region.
Canada’s Indigenous Protected Areas offer another example
of a coordinated, inclusive governance structure with Indigenous
management at its core. “Indigenous Protected Areas [IPAs] are
based on the idea of a protected area explicitly designed to
accommodate and support an Indigenous vision of a working
landscape.”182 They provide for conservation measures while also
prioritizing hiring of Indigenous People via monitoring and guardian
programs. They also provide a means for healing and reconciliation
by supporting communities and individuals in regaining land-based
life skills, reconnecting youth with their cultural traditions and
language, collecting and documenting Indigenous knowledge, and
guaranteeing that there will always be ‘places that are theirs.’ 183
Canada’s first Indigenous Protected Area, the Edéhzhíe Protected
Area in Fort Providence, NWT, was established by the Dehcho First
Nations and the Canadian Government in 2018. 184 Inuit are leading
development of several potential marine Indigenous Protected

Mary Simon, A New Shared Arctic Leadership Model, INDIGENOUS AND
NORTHERN AFFAIRS CANADA 19 (March 2017),
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/aanc-inac/R74-38-2017eng.pdf, [ https://perma.cc/24TJ-P7BH].
183 Id.
184 Mieke Coppes, For the first time in Canadian history, there is an official
Indigenous protected area, HIGH NORTH NEWS (Oct. 22, 2018),
https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/first-indigenous-protected-area-designatedcanada, [https://perma.cc/7NWY-5JFR].
182
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Areas in the Arctic, including Imappivut in northern Labrador 185 and
Pikialasorsuaq in northern Baffin Bay. 186
Canadian law provides several other mechanisms for
creating marine protected areas, including Marine Protected Areas,
National Marine Conservation Areas, and National Wildlife
Areas.187 These mechanisms require federal agencies to negotiate
with both Indigenous land claims organizations and Inuit
communities to establish a protected area. 188 Under these provisions,
the Government of Canada (Parks Canada), the Nunavut
Government and the Qikiqtani Inuit Association agreed to establish
Tallurutiup Imanga National Marine Conservation Area at the
eastern entrance of the Northwest Passage. 189 Once formally
established, Tallurutiup Imanga will be the largest marine protected
area in Canada.190 To date, a boundary has been negotiated, and the
Canadian government and Qikiqtani Inuit Association have
announced a package of conservation jobs and infrastructure
benefits for the conservation area. 191 Collaborative management
Levon Sevunts, Inuit traditional knowledge to guide marine management
plan off Labrador coast, RADIO CANADA INTERNATIONAL, (Sept. 29, 2017,
16:45) https://www.rcinet.ca/en/2017/09/29/inuit-traditional-knowledge-toguide-marine-management-plan-off-labrador-coast/, [https://perma.cc/KMU93PDJ].
186 Dept. of Fisheries & Oceans Canada, Pikialasorsuaq (North Water Polynya)
(Aug. 1, 2019), http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/managementgestion/pikialasorsuaq-eng.html, [https://perma.cc/7ZFN-ATD5].
187 Indigenous Protected Areas and Marine Conservation, OCEANS NORTH,
https://oceansnorth.org/en/what-we-do/indigenous-protected-areas-marineconservation/, [https://perma.cc/5PE5-Y8Q6] (last visited August 27, 2019).
188 Id.
189 Canada’s newest and largest Marine Protected Area: Tallurutiup Imanga–
Lancaster Sound, IUCN (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.iucn.org/news/protectedareas/201708/canada%E2%80%99s-newest-and-largest-marine-protected-areatallurutiup-imanga-%E2%80%93-lancaster-sound, [https://perma.cc/89LZNHZY].
190 Id.
191 National Marine Conservation Areas: Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreement,
PARKS CANADA (Aug. 1, 2019) https://www.pc.gc.ca/en/amnc-nmca/cnamnccnnmca/tallurutiup-imanga/entente-agreement, [https://perma.cc/J2S5-B982].
185
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between Inuit and Canada, and ensuring benefits to Inuit in the
region from the designation, are at the heart of the agreement. 192
Canada’s recognition of underlying rights for Indigenous
Peoples is notably different than that of the Unites States.193 While
the underlying legal frameworks are different, the Canadian
approaches serve as important examples that can inform efforts in
the U.S., and these concepts could be applied with the appropriate
enabling legislation.
B.

Managing for Increasing Vessel Traffic in the U.S.
Arctic: Improving Safety and Reducing Risks to the
Marine Environment

Beyond comprehensive governance changes, regulators and
stakeholders could act to put in place specific vessel traffic
management measures that would go further to help prevent
accidents, reduce the risks from oil spills, reduce air, water, and
noise pollution, and protect marine mammals. This section outlines
some of those measures.

See also Tallurutiup Imanga National Marine Conservation Area, PARKS
CANADA (undated), https://www.pc.gc.ca/en/amnc-nmca/cnamnccnnmca/tallurutiup-imanga, [https://perma.cc/8Q7C-T97J].
192 Id. See also Tallurutiup Imanga National Marine Conservation Area, PARKS
CANADA (undated), https://www.pc.gc.ca/en/amnc-nmca/cnamnccnnmca/tallurutiup-imanga, [https://perma.cc/8Q7C-T97J].
193 See Melanie Zurba et al., Indigenous Protected and Conserved Areas
(IPCAs), Aichi Target 11 and Canada’s Pathway to Target 1: Focusing
Conservation on Reconciliation 8 Land 1, 4–6 (2019),
https://doi.org/10.3390/land8010010, [https://perma.cc/7UC2-QKFV]. Cf.
DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS
265–324 (3d ed. 2012).
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Adopt Preventative Measures to Further Reduce the Risk of
Vessel Accidents in the Arctic

Traveling by boat in the Arctic will always involve some
degree of risk, both to mariners and passengers. Nonetheless, it is
possible to implement additional measures designed to reduce the
risk of maritime accidents that jeopardize human safety and—if
such accidents do occur—improve the efficacy of response efforts.
Measures could include designating additional formal vessel traffic
routes, applying Polar Code safety provisions to a broader range of
vessels, updating navigational charts, and supplementing vessel
traffic monitoring systems.
As noted above, the IMO adopted ATBAs in the Aleutian
Islands and the Bering Strait region and two-way vessel traffic lanes
for the Bering Strait region. Additional routing measures could
further enhance safety in the region. To that end, the United States
and Russia should move forward with a joint proposal to designate
a transboundary ATBA around the Diomede Islands in the middle
of the Bering Strait. Such an ATBA could provide important
safeguards to ships transiting the Strait by helping to ensure they
keep a safe distance from the shores of these islands.
Stakeholders in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas should also
take advantage of the U.S Coast Guard’s PARS for the Alaskan
Arctic Coast to consider whether designation of ATBAs and traffic
lanes would improve safety in those waters. Among other things,
designating formal traffic lanes could encourage more predictable
vessel movement and could help ensure that designated routes are
charted to modern standards and free from navigational hazards.
Designation of ATBAs could encourage vessels to steer clear of
potentially dangerous areas, or areas where large vessels may
encounter Indigenous hunters in small craft. As stakeholders and
regulators explore the potential for additional ATBAs, they should
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consider the possibility of seasonal or dynamic ATBAs that adjust
to changing conditions—either in real time or on a seasonal basis. 194
These options—particularly dynamic ATBAs—would require good
data and communication among regulators, mariners and other
affected stakeholders. 195 In all cases, identification of potential
vessel traffic lanes and ATBAs should involve meaningful
collaboration with Indigenous residents of the region to ensure their
perspectives guide the process, along with other factors including
safety and freedom of navigation.
In addition to improving safety through the identification
and designation of additional vessel traffic lanes and ATBAs, the
IMO should broaden key provisions of the Polar Code so that they
apply to additional categories of vessels. As noted above, existing
Polar Code safety provisions do not apply to fishing vessels, even
though there are more fishing vessels operating in Arctic waters than
any other category of vessel. 196 Some officials contemplated
expanding the scope of the Polar Code to cover additional vessel
types even before the current version of the Code took effect. 197
More recently, the IMO started to actively consider such an
expansion. In a late-2018 meeting, the IMO’s Maritime Safety
Committee agreed on a “roadmap” that could result in adoption of

Siders et al., supra note 16, at 181–83.
Id.
196 Hendrik Schopmans, Revisiting the Polar Code: Where Do We Stand? Arctic
Institute, CTR. FOR CIRCUMPOLAR SECURITY STUDIES (June 11, 2019).
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/revisiting-polar-code/,
[https://perma.cc/C3GW-DEGX].
197 See, e.g., Craig H. Allen, Polar Code rings in the New Year for Arctic
shipping, PAC. MARITIME MAG. (Dec. 1, 2016)
https://www.pacmar.com/story/2016/12/01/features/polar-code-rings-in-thenew-year-for-arctic-shipping/474.html, [https://perma.cc/AE83-A8YM] (noting
that in 2015, a U.S. State Department official “suggested that the IMO memberstates may review whether to extend the Code's safety measures to non-SOLAS
vessels” including fishing vessels and other smaller vessels).
194
195
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revisions to the Polar Code and/or SOLAS by 2022.198 In 2019, the
Committee tasked a subcommittee with considering “the
consequences and feasibility” of applying key chapters of the Polar
Code to additional categories of vessel. 199 At the same meeting, the
Committee approved a draft resolution urging IMO Member States
to voluntarily implement “safety measures of the Polar Code on
ships not certified under the SOLAS Convention.”200 The IMO
Assembly will consider adopting the draft resolution in late 2019. 201
Improvements to information infrastructure could also
bolster maritime safety in the Arctic. Less than two percent of U.S.
Arctic waters have been charted using modern survey methods. 202
Updates to nautical charts in the U.S. Arctic should be prioritized
and accelerated. Recent years have witnessed significant advances
in the use of automatic identification system (AIS) technologies,
which use VHF and satellites to transmit information about a
vessel’s location and other information from the vessel to shore and
to other vessels, in real-time or near real-time. At present, AIS is
used to avoid collisions between vessels, monitor vessel traffic in
U.S. Arctic waters, and encourage regulatory compliance. 203 AIS
Int’l Maritime Org., Maritime Safety Comm. (MSC), 100th session, 3–7 Dec.
2018.
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MSC/Pages/MSC100th-session.aspx, [https://perma.cc/B9EY-USAR].
199 Int’l Maritime Org., Maritime Safety Comm. (MSC), 101st session, 5–14
June 2019.
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MSC/Pages/MSC101st-session.aspx, [https://perma.cc/UBX9-J47Y].
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Comm. on the Marine Transp. Sys., A TEN-YEAR PRIORITIZATION OF
INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS IN THE U.S. ARCTIC 12 (Apr. 15, 2016),
https://www.cmts.gov/downloads/NSAR_1.1.2_10Year_MTS_Investment_Framework_Final_5_4_16.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/HYY8-8KYQ].
203 See, e.g., Monitoring Center, ALASKA MARITIME PREVENTION & RESPONSE
NETWORK, https://www.alaskaseas.org/vessel-monitoring/monitoring-center/,
[https://perma.cc/654X-AZ7D] (describing use of AIS to monitor vessel traffic
198

110

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1

systems, however, are capable of much more. A Coast Guard
research and development program explored the viability of using
AIS to transmit relevant safety and navigation information to ships
in real-time, on an as-needed basis. 204 This could include
information about the presence of subsistence hunters or dangerous
weather conditions, among other things.205 The Coast Guard should
facilitate these advances in navigation technologies to improve
communication and safety in Arctic waters.
2.

Reducing the Risk from Oil Spills in Arctic Waters

As noted above, the vast majority of vessels operating in
Arctic waters use some form of oil to power their engines. Some of
these vessels run on heavy fuel oil, which poses a particular threat
when spilled.206 Some of these vessels carry large volumes—up to
100,000 barrels—of oil-based fuel as cargo, 207 and some engage in
lightering operations that transfer fuel from one ship to another. All
of these vessels and operations contribute to the risk of a potentially
catastrophic oil spill in Arctic waters, and all point to the need to
adopt additional measures to minimize that risk.
If implemented, many of the recommendations from the
previous section would decrease the likelihood of oil spills.
Designation of additional vessel traffic lanes and ATBAs can reduce
to aid compliance and identify deviations and emergencies); see also Superior
vessel tracking with state of the art vessel monitoring, 1-CALL ALASKA: A
RESOLVE COMPANY, https://1callalaska.com/services/vessel-tracking/,
[https://perma.cc/2Z44-4WGJ] (describing vessel monitoring system).
204 Irene Gonin & Gregory Johnson, Alaska AIS Transmit Prototype Test,
Evaluation, and Transition Summary Report, U.S. COAST GUARD ACQUISITION
DIRECTORATE: RES. & DEV. CTR. (Oct. 2018).
205 See id., at 27, 30.
206 Bryan Comer & Naya Olmer, Heavy fuel oil is considered the most
significant threat to the Arctic. So why isn’t it banned yet?, INT’L COUNCIL ON
CLEAN TRANSP. (Sept. 15, 2016), https://theicct.org/blogs/staff/heavy-fuel-oilconsidered-most-significant-threat-to-arctic, [https://perma.cc/H6L7-53B6].
207 BERING SEA RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 25, at 52.
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the chance of accidents by making traffic patterns more predictable,
keeping ships away from dangerous areas, and helping ships stay in
waters that have been charted to modern standards.208 Moreover, to
the extent that additional ATBAs and vessel traffic routes encourage
vessels to stay away from ecologically sensitive areas, these
measures could help minimize impacts from any oil spills that do
occur. Although oil spilled in the marine environment will move
with wind and currents, thoughtfully-designed vessel traffic lanes
and ATBAs could help keep oil from reaching environmentally
sensitive areas.
Beyond the measures discussed in the previous section, there
are other ways to reduce the risk from oil spills in the Arctic.
Eliminating the use of heavy fuel oil is one such measure.209 Vessels
are already prohibited from using heavy fuel oil in Antarctic
waters210 and the Polar Code recommends—but does not require—
that mariners avoid using heavy fuel oil in the Arctic. 211 In 2017, the
IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee agreed to
develop measures designed to reduce the risks of the use of heavy
fuel oil as fuel by ships in Arctic waters. 212 The following year, a
group of member countries, led by Finland, proposed banning heavy
fuel oil as a shipping fuel in Arctic waters. The proposal noted that
a single heavy fuel oil spill “could have devastating and lasting
effects on fragile Arctic marine and coastal environments,” and that
See supra Part V.B.I (discussing benefits of ATBAs).
Det Norske Veritas, REPORT: HEAVY FUEL IN THE ARCTIC (PHASE 1) 2 (2011),
https://www.pame.is/images/03_Projects/HFO/HFO_in_the_Artic_Phase_I.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/6TW3-EFTW] (noting that due to the particular properties of
heavy fuel oil, “significant risk reduction will be achieved” by switching from
heavy fuel oil to distillate fuel-types in the Arctic).
210 MARPOL, supra note 85, at Annex 1, Reg. 43, Ch. 9, “Special Requirements
for the Use or Carriage of Oils in the Antarctic Area.”
211 POLAR CODE, supra note 130, at Part II-B, Ch. 1.1.
212 See, e.g., Int’l Maritime Org, Marine Env’t Prot. Comm. (MEPC), 71st
session, 3–7 July 2017,
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MEPC/Pages/MEPC71.aspx, [https://perma.cc/DHR2-NNFW].
208
209
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a ban on heavy fuel oil “should be implemented as soon as
possible.”213 In its October 2018 meeting, the Marine Environment
Protection Committee tasked a subcommittee with developing “a
ban on heavy fuel oil for use and carriage as fuel by ships in Arctic
waters, based on an assessment of the impacts of such a ban.” 214 The
IMO should finalize, adopt, and implement a ban on heavy fuel oil
in Arctic waters as quickly as possible. This could be accomplished
via an amendment to MARPOL Annex 1 or by another legally
binding instrument.
A ban on heavy fuel oil in the Arctic would be a significant
step in reducing the threat posed by oil spills there. Ultimately,
however, switching from distillates to alternative, non-fossil fuels
would offer even greater protection against oil spills. In the near
term, use of LNG as a marine fuel would virtually eliminate the
impacts of a fuel spill, because LNG will “immediately start to
vaporize after a release” and will “disperse rapidly depending on the
local wind conditions.”215 In general, an LNG spill would be “far
more benign than either [heavy fuel oil] or diesel oil spills.” 216 Even
so, LNG is still a fossil fuel, and its combustion contributes to global
warming.217 For that and other reasons, other fuel alternatives—
including battery-power—are preferred options.
Int’l Maritime Org., Marine Env’t Prot. Comm. (MEPC), 72d session, agenda
item 11, Development of Measures to Reduce Risks of Use and Carriage of
Heavy Fuel Oil as Fuel by Ships in Arctic Waters: Proposal to ban heavy fuel
oil use and carriage as fuel by ships in Arctic waters, submitted by Finland,
Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the
United States (Feb. 2, 2018),
https://www.transportstyrelsen.se/contentassets/57f800efae134fe0af0808d2773a
14f2/72-11-1.pdf, [https://perma.cc/Z6CL-SAWH].
214 Int’l Maritime Org., Marine Env’t Prot. Comm. (MEPC), 73rd session, 22–26
Oct. 2018,
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MEPC/Pages/MEPC73rd-session.aspx, [https://perma.cc/HA4Q-URHP].
215 Vard Marine, supra note 101, at 36.
216 Id.
217 See, e.g., id. at 33 (concluding that while using LNG as a marine fuel will
emit less CO2 and CO2 equivalent than conventional fuels, reduction of
213
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Another opportunity to reduce the risk of oil spills in Arctic
waters involves improving the safety of lightering operations.
Businesses engaged in lightering in western and Arctic Alaska, with
the support of the Coast Guard, are already beginning to discuss
ways to bolster safety and reduce risks in the region.218 As those
discussions continue, operators should consider identifying areas
best suited for lightering operations or areas where lightering should
not occur.219 In selecting these areas, operators should seek out and
incorporate input from residents of local communities.220
Identification of specific lightering areas may identify regions or
corridors where updated hydrographic surveys would most benefit
lightering operations, which could help avoid accidents caused by
outdated or inaccurate charting. 221 Lightering operators could also
develop a shared suite of best practices designed to help ensure shipto-ship transfers take place only when weather, wind, and sea
conditions are safe and when available spill response equipment can
be deployed effectively. 222 They could also consider whether
existing oil spill response equipment is best suited to the conditions
where lightering operations take place. 223 Use of onboard cameras
could be a cost-effective way to improve safety via remote
monitoring of lightering operations.224 Other risk mitigation tools
may include drills and exercises to practice rapid deployment of spill
response equipment as well as table-top or field exercises to test

greenhouse gas emissions will not be as dramatic as reductions in NOx, Sox and
particulate matter emissions).
218 Personal communication, Cap’t Patrick Hilbert, Chief of Prevention, U.S.
Coast Guard Dist. 17 (Juneau, AK).
219 OVERVIEW OF TANKER LIGHTERING, supra note 24, at 35.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 34; see also id. at 19–20 (describing the soft grounding of tanker
involved in lightering operations in western Alaska in an area where water depth
shown on nautical chart was inaccurate).
222 Id. at 35.
223 Id. at 36.
224 Id. at 34.

114

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1

preparedness for incidents including grounding or loss-ofpropulsion events.225
Finally, impacts from oil spills could be reduced if local
communities had additional spill response equipment and training.
With response assets located thousands of miles away from the
Bering Strait, “Indigenous communities are likely to be first
responders to any accident in the Bering Strait.” 226 While locating
appropriate response equipment in communities and training
community members to use it would not lower the risk of a spill, it
could reduce the severity of its consequences.
3.

Implement Measures to Mitigate Impacts Related to the
Discharge of Sewage and Graywater

Residents of the Bering Strait region have expressed concern
about the impacts of discharge from vessels into the marine
environment.227 As noted above, IMO regulations impose no
restrictions on the discharge of graywater from vessels and allow
discharge of even raw sewage so long as a vessel is moving at least
four knots and is positioned at least twelve nautical miles from land
or ice.228
International standards governing the discharge should be
strengthened. At a minimum, the IMO should require ships to treat
discharge graywater in the same way they are required to treat
discharge of sewage. This could be done via an amendment to

Id. at 36–37.
Arctic Vessel Traffic and Indigenous Communities, supra note 9, at 291.
227 See, e.g., Kawerak, Inc., BERING STRAIT VOICES ON ARCTIC SHIPPING:
MOVING FORWARD TO PROTECT ALASKA NATIVE WAYS OF LIFE AND THE
NATURAL RESOURCES WE RELY ON 12 (2016), [https://perma.cc/8ZNL-E859]
(describing resident of Elim voice concern over ships dumping wastes in the
water).
228 See supra Part III.B.3.
225
226
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MARPOL and/or the Polar Code. IMO could also go further and
require ships to be even farther from shore or ice—more than twelve
nautical miles—before discharging untreated sewage or
graywater.229 Similarly, IMO could amend MARPOL and/or the
Polar Code to require more additional testing, sampling, monitoring
and record-keeping with respect to wastewater treatment plants and
discharge of sewage and graywater in Arctic waters. 230
In addition to ship-based discharge limits, discharge can be
regulated by area-based protections. In the United States, individual
states may apply to the Environmental Protection Agency to
establish no-discharge zones for sewage in state waters,231 but this
type of no-discharge zone would apply only within three nautical
miles of the shore and therefore would have limited benefit. 232 Nodischarge zones can also be created in international waters by
designating a “special area” that limits discharge of sewage pursuant
to Annex IV of MARPOL.233 At present, the Baltic Sea is the only
Annex IV special area, 234 and its protections are just beginning to be
phased in.235 Nonetheless, it may be useful to explore the possibility
of proposing one or more additional Annex IV special areas in
See Parks et al., supra note 84, at 7 (suggesting IMO impose more stringent
regulations on discharges of sewage and graywater).
230 Id. at 7.
231 33 U.S.C. § 1322(f)(3); see also 40 C.F.R. § 140.4.
232 Parks et al., supra note 84, at 8.
233 Under MARPOL, special areas are defined as areas where “for technical
reasons relating to their oceanographical and ecological condition and to their
sea traffic, the adoption of special mandatory methods for the prevention of sea
pollution is required.” Int’l Maritime Org., Special Areas Under MARPOL
(undated),
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/SpecialAreasUnderMARPOL/Pa
ges/Default.aspx, [https://perma.cc/P2A7-YRB4] (last visited Aug. 28, 2019).
234 Int’l Maritime Org., Special Areas under MARPOL (undated),
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/SpecialAreasUnderMARPOL/Pa
ges/Default.aspx, [https://perma.cc/P2A7-YRB4].
235 See DNG-VL, Baltic Sea – First Marpol special area for sewage (Sept. 18,
2017), https://www.dnvgl.com/news/baltic-sea-first-marpol-special-area-forsewage-100367, [https://perma.cc/44A8-Q48A] (listing dates that Baltic Sea
special area will take effect for certain vessel types).
229
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Arctic waters. Indigenous residents have called for a no discharge
zone in the Bering Strait for many years, due to its importance to
marine mammals and the communities who depend on them. 236
To the extent that vessels traveling in the Arctic are
prohibited from discharging or elect not to discharge sewage and
graywater, they will need to store those wastes onboard. Polar Code
regulations could be strengthened to call for increased storage
capacity for vessels traveling in Arctic waters. 237 In addition, it
would be beneficial to increase the availability of port facilities
where vessels can safely offload these and other wastes. If these
“port reception facilities” were more widely available in Arctic
waters, it could facilitate designation of an Annex IV special area. 238
Establishing adequate port reception facilities in the U.S. Arctic
could be costly239 and would require close collaboration with
residents of the Arctic to ensure their communities were not unduly
burdened by accepting wastes from ships. 240 Nonetheless, if done

Arctic Vessel Traffic and Indigenous Communities, supra note 9, at 291.
See Parks et al., supra note 84, at 7.
238 See, e.g., Int’l Maritime Org., Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of
1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, 1973: Special Area Provisions and the Designation of the Baltic Sea
as a Special Area under MARPOL Annex IV, MARINE ENV’T PROT. COMM. RES.
200(62) § 4 (July 15 2011) (adding new regulation requiring availability of
adequate port reception facilities before special area designation takes effect),
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/Sewage/Doc
uments/200(62).pdf, [https://perma.cc/8QVV-V4EM]. See also Alex Kemp &
Gudmund Bernitz, Port reception facilities for waste water in the Baltic Sea: fit
for purpose? HFW BRIEFINGS (October 2017), http://www.hfw.com/Portreception-facilities-for-waste-water-in-the-Baltic-Sea-fit-for-purpose-October2017, [https://perma.cc/6E5P-CAV7] (observing that implementation of the
Baltic Sea special area was “initially subject to sufficient notifications to the
IMO on the availability of adequate [Port Reception Facilities] from states
bordering the Baltic Sea”).
239 Parks et al., supra note 84, at 7.
240 See, e.g., Alex Kemp & Gudmund Bernitz, supra note 238 (noting that local
wastewater management systems may not be well-suited to accept sewage from
ships, “which may contain heavy fuel oil and other contaminants”).
236
237
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properly, build-out of these facilities would be a critical investment
for a clean, healthy Arctic marine environment in the future.
4.

Curb Subsea Noise in Arctic Waters

In 2014, the IMO adopted voluntary Guidelines for the
Reduction of Underwater Noise from Commercial Shipping to
Address Adverse Impacts on Marine Life. 241 Among other things,
the Guidelines provide guidance on designing quieter ships and
reducing noise from existing ships. 242 Ship designers and operators
should use these guidelines to help reduce noise in Arctic waters.
The IMO guidance recommends operational measures like slowing
down to reduce propeller cavitation—the main source of noise from
ships243—and using routing measures to keep vessels away from
areas that may be particularly sensitive to undersea noise from
ships.244 Another alternative is to employ measures designed to
maintain the relative quiet of areas that are not yet subject to
significant amounts of undersea noise. 245
Port-based incentives are another way to encourage quieter
vessels. The Vancouver Fraser Port Authority instituted an
“EcoAction Program” that allows vessels that use technologies to
reduce underwater noise (and other environmental impacts) to apply

Int’l Maritime Org., Guidelines for the Reduction of Underwater Noise from
Commercial Shipping to Address Adverse Impacts on Marine Life,
MEPC.1/Circ.833 (April 7, 2014),
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Documents/833%20Guidance%
20on%20reducing%20underwater%20noise%20from%20commercial%20shippi
ng%2C.pdf, [https://perma.cc/2G79-FUBH].
242 Id. §§ 7–10.
243 Id. § 3.2; § 10.4.
244 Id. § 10.5.
245 R. Williams et al., Impacts of Anthropogenic Noise on Marine Life:
Publication Patterns, New Discoveries, and Future Directions in Research and
Management, 115 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 17, 23 (2015).
241
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for up to a 47% reduction in harbor fees.246 The program recognizes
four “quiet ship notations” from organizations that establish industry
standards, as well as five propeller designs that help reduce
underwater noise from ships. 247 Ships with one or more of these
quiet ship notations, performance indicator level, or technologies are
eligible to apply for the reduced fees.248 Regulators, port authorities
and other stakeholders should consider how routing measures and
port-based incentives might be used to encourage quieter shipping
in Arctic waters.
More work is needed to understand and address impacts of
underwater noise from vessel traffic. Recognizing this, a number of
delegations to the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection
Committee continue to express interest in more research to better
understand the impacts of underwater noise from shipping.249 In
addition, the Arctic Council’s Protection of the Arctic Marine
Environment’s work plan for 2019-2021 includes a project designed
to estimate and map vessel noise levels in the Arctic, identify areas
of special ecological or cultural concern, and develop possible
mitigation measures.250

Vancouver Fraser Port Authority expands noise reduction criteria to
encourage quieter waters for endangered whales, PORT OF VANCOUVER (Feb.
11, 2019), https://www.portvancouver.com/news-and-media/news/vancouverfraser-port-authority-expands-noise-reduction-criteria-to-encourage-quieterwaters-for-endangered-whales/, [https://perma.cc/TKQ7-G5CJ].
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Ship Noise: Ship noise can have negative impacts—on both humans and
marine life, INT’L MARITIME ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/Noise.aspx,
[.https://perma.cc/WYK4-SG4R].
250 Arctic Council, PAME WORK PLAN 2019-2021 31,
https://pame.is/index.php/document-library/pame-reports-new/pame-ministerialdeliverables/2019-11th-arctic-council-ministerial-meeting-rovaniemifinland/426-pame-2019-2021-work-plan/file, [https://perma.cc/2XAT-KHUZ].
246
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Reduce the Risk of Ship Strikes

It is possible to take steps to minimize the risk of ship strikes
on large, slow-moving whales in Arctic waters. Scientists,
indigenous experts, mariners, and other stakeholders could work
together to identify areas where there is a high risk of ship strikes.
Regulators could designate vessel traffic lanes and ATBAs that are,
to the extent possible, designed to keep large or fast-moving vessels
away from areas where large whales are known to aggregate.
Regulators could also consider the potential for seasonal or dynamic
routing measures to better account for seasonal migration. 251 In
cases where it is impractical to keep vessels away from large whales,
regulators should encourage or mandate speeds of less than ten knots
when large whales are known to be in the vicinity.252 As noted
above, new technologies that integrate with ships’ AIS and
navigation equipment could allow mariners to be notified
automatically when they are entering areas of known marine
mammal aggregations.253 In addition to reducing the risk of ship
strikes on whales, improved communication between residents of
Arctic communities and vessels could also reduce the potential for
conflicts or accidents between commercial vessels and subsistence
hunters operating small craft.
6.

Prevent the Spread of Invasive Species in Arctic Waters

Because marine invasive species are nearly impossible to
remove once they have taken hold, 254 prevention is the best
Siders et al., supra note 16, at 181–83. See also Huntington et al., supra note
140, at §§ 4–6.
252 See, e.g., Reducing Ship Strikes to North Atlantic Right Whales, NAT’L
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/endangered-speciesconservation/reducing-ship-strikes-north-atlantic-right-whales,
[https://perma.cc/7MVC-KS5E].
253 See supra Part V.B.I.
254 Molnar et al., supra note 124, at 485.
251
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approach. The IMO has adopted a mandatory convention to address
the spread of invasive species from one region to another via ballast
water,255 and has approved voluntary guidelines to address the
spread of invasive species via biofouling. 256 Outside the IMO, the
Arctic Council’s working groups on Conservation of Arctic Flora
and Fauna and Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment
published an Action Plan on Arctic invasive alien species. 257 While
the Action Plan recognizes ballast water and hull fouling as a vector
for invasive species in Arctic waters,258 it does not offer specific
suggestions beyond encouraging nations to collaborate “to
implement effective programs for preventing the introduction and
controlling the spread of invasive alien species,”259 and assess
whether the IMO should develop Arctic-specific guidance for
minimizing the spread of invasive species from shipping. 260
Development of an Arctic-specific plan to address the spread of
marine invasive species from shipping may be the most appropriate
next step. Such a plan could trigger more stringent treatment or
enforcement standards for ballast water, and more robust or
effective hull-cleaning requirements to minimize hull fouling. In
addition, scientific monitoring and assessment of invasion risk
related to vessel traffic in the Arctic should continue.

See, e.g., International Convention for the Control and Management of
Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM), INT’L MARITIME ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Internatio
nal-Convention-for-the-Control-and-Management-of-Ships'-Ballast-Water-andSediments-(BWM).aspx, [https://perma.cc/H4VJ-MT4K].
256 Int’l Maritime Org., 2011 Guidelines for the Control and Management of
Ships’ Biofouling to Minimize the Transfer of Invasive Aquatic Species, MPEC
62/24/Add. 1 (July 15, 2011),
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Biofouling/Documents/RESOLU
TION%20MEPC.207%5b62%5d.pdf, [https://perma.cc/W74D-L4LN].
257 Arctic Council, Arctic Invasive Alien Species: Strategy and Action Plan
(2017), https://www.caff.is/strategies-series/415-arctic-invasive-alien-speciesstrategy-and-action-plan, [https://perma.cc/X2NQ-NF6V].
258 Id., at 9.
259 Id., at 12.
260 Id., at 13.
255
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Consider Designation of One of More Particularly Sensitive
Sea Areas

As defined by the IMO, a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area
(PSSA) “is an area that needs special protection through action by
IMO because of its significance for recognized ecological, socioeconomic, or scientific attributes where such attributes may be
vulnerable to damage by international shipping activities.” 261
PSSAs provide a way to package together multiple IMO mitigation
measures. In the PSSA context, these mitigation measures are called
“associated protective measures,” and they are adopted along with
the PSSA.262
Associated protective measures can include Special Area or
Emissions Control Area designation, application of special
discharge restrictions, routing and reporting measures (including
ATBAs) and “development and adoption of other measures aimed
at protecting specific sea areas against environmental damage from
ships, provided that they have an identified legal basis.”263 There are
a variety of criteria for designation as a PSSA, and specific
parameters for its application. 264 While PSSAs only provide for
regulation of shipping impacts, their designation provides an
opportunity for associated protective measures which cover a range
of impacts, and therefore provide an opportunity for broad
protections from shipping threats. Designation of a PSSA in the
Bering Strait region—and perhaps elsewhere in the U.S. Arctic—
may be an efficient way to bundle multiple protections against
impacts from increasing vessel traffic in the region.
Int’l Maritime Org. Res. A.982(24), U.N. Doc. A 24/Res.982, at 3 (Dec. 1,
2005), available at
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PSSAs/Documents/A24Res.982.pdf, [https://perma.cc/NG6H-MCLU].
262 Id.
263 Id., at 8.
264 See generally id.
261
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Curb Harmful Emissions from Vessels in the Arctic and
Reduce and Eventually Decarbonize the Global Shipping
Fleet

The measures discussed in the sections above are important
to increase shipping safety, reduce the risk of oil spills, minimize
impacts from discharge of sewage and graywater, quiet ship-related
noise, avoid ship strikes, and prevent the spread of invasive species
in Arctic waters. As important as those measures are, the rapid and
profound impacts of climate change in the Arctic make it absolutely
critical to act now to reduce emissions from vessels that operate in
the Arctic, and to reduce and eventually eliminate carbon emissions
from the global shipping sector.
There are ways to reduce emissions from vessels operating
in the Arctic, including area-based measures and switching to
cleaner fuels. For instance, it is possible to design and implement
Arctic-specific, area-based limits on emissions from vessels. This
could be done through designation of an IMO Emissions Control
Area (ECA) for some or all Arctic waters. ECAs are areas within
which vessels are subject to emissions limits that are more stringent
than normal; they are designated under MARPOL Annex VI and
designed to reduce harmful emissions from shipping.265 At present,
a North American ECA reaches as far north as Southeast Alaska but
does not extend to the Arctic. 266 If IMO designated an Arctic ECA
that required the use of 0.1% sulfur fuel (consistent with the existing

Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships, INT’L MARITIME ORG. (undated),
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution
/Pages/Air-Pollution.aspx, [https://perma.cc/8RXK-ZHCW].
266 See generally Information on North American Emission Control Area (ECA),
U.N. Doc. MPEC.1/Circ.723 (2010)
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/mepc1-circ-rena-eca.pdf, [https://perma.cc/EDJ2-TYPW].
265
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North American ECA), it would result in a 50% drop in black carbon
emissions in the Arctic.267
Phasing out the use of heavy fuel oil in Arctic waters is
another way to reduce emissions in the Arctic region. As noted
above, contaminants in heavy fuel oil create exhaust emissions that
are particularly dirty. 268 Even so, heavy fuel oil is—for now at
least—still used by some vessels transiting Arctic waters.269 If these
vessels switched from heavy fuel oil to higher-quality, low-sulfur
fuels, it would result in a substantial reduction in emissions
including a 5–8% reduction in CO2 emissions, a 95% decrease in
SO2, a 93% decrease in particulate SO4 emissions, and a 75%
decrease in organic particulate emissions. Studies suggest it would
also reduce black carbon emissions by 50% or more.270 Switching
to LNG would result in still greater reductions in emissions, 271 and
switching to electric propulsion could eliminate emissions
altogether, depending on the source of the electricity.
While reducing emissions from vessels operating in the
Arctic will yield important benefits, regional-scale action is
insufficient to address the challenge of global climate change.
Instead, it is necessary to reduce, and eventually eliminate, vessel
emissions on a global scale. In 2018, the IMO adopted an initial
strategy on the reduction of greenhouse gases from ships.272
Daniel Lack, The Impacts of an Arctic Shipping HFO Ban on Emissions of
Black Carbon 12 (Sept. 2016), https://www.hfofreearctic.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/The-Impacts-of-an-Arctic-Shipping-HFO-Ban-onEmissions-of-Black-Carbon.pdf, [https://perma.cc/P427-UJMB].
268 See supra Part III.B.4.
269 See Lack, supra note 267, at 8 (noting that 75% of fuel carried by vessels in
the Arctic during 2012 was heavy fuel oil).
270 Id., at 11–12.
271 Vard Marine, supra note 101, at 33.
272 Int’l Maritime Org., Initial IMO Strategy on reduction of GHG emissions
from ships, Res. MEPC.304(72) (April 13, 2018) [hereinafter Initial IMO
Strategy],
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Documents/Resolution%20MEPC.304%2872
267
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The IMO strategy first calls for adoption of short-term
measures to quickly reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the
shipping sector.273 Slow steaming could be an important way to
achieve short-term reductions. If a ship reduces its speed by 10%, it
can reduce fuel consumption by nearly 20%.274 On a global scale,
researchers predict that slowing the container, dry bulk, and
crude/product tanker fleet by 10, 20, and 30% would reduce overall
emissions by 13, 24 and 33% respectively. 275 One study of global
shipping concluded implementation of existing technologies and
operational measures could reduce shipping emissions from 2008
levels by up to 75% by 2050.276
The IMO strategy also calls for a plan to meet mid-term
(2023–2030) and long-term (2030–2050) goals to curb greenhouse
gas emissions from the shipping sector.277 IMO’s plan calls for 2050
greenhouse gas emissions from the shipping sector to be reduced by
at least half, relative to 2008 levels. 278 Importantly, the 50%
reduction is a floor, not a ceiling. During negotiations, a coalition of

%29%20on%20Initial%20IMO%20Strategy%20on%20reduction%20of%20GH
G%20emissions%20from%20ships.pdf, [https://perma.cc/RFW9-A6U4].
273 Id. §§ 4.1.1, 4.7.
274 Speed Management, Global Maritime Energy Eﬀiciency Partnership
(undated), https://glomeep.imo.org/technology/speed-management/,
[https://perma.cc/4FFH-DZY8].
275 J. Faber et al., Regulating speed: a short-term measure to reduce maritime
GHG emissions 10 (2017), https://cedelft.eu/en/publications/2024/regulatingspeed-a-short-term-measure-to-reduce-maritime-ghg-emissions,
[https://perma.cc/M3YB-4F7L].
276 E. Bouman et.al. State-of-the-art technologies, measures, and potential for
reducing GHG emissions from shipping – A review, 52 Transp. Res. Part D 408,
418 (May 2017),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1361920916307015,
[https://perma.cc/XG7Q-TKFZ].
277 Initial IMO Strategy, supra note 272, §§ 3.1.3, 4.1.2, 4.1.3.
278 Id. at § 3.1.3.
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states argued for complete decarbonization of the shipping sector, 279
and the IMO plan leaves room to continue to push for that approach.
While transitioning to a fully decarbonized shipping sector
by 2050 might strike some as unrealistic, at least one major player
in the shipping industry has already pledged to achieve zero-carbon
emissions from its fleet by 2050.280 Given the pace and scale of the
climate challenge facing the Arctic—and the global ocean—a rapid
and aggressive transition toward a zero-carbon shipping fleet is the
only responsible path forward.
VI. CONCLUSION
Climate change is affecting the ocean all around the world,
and its impacts are particularly acute in the fast-warming Arctic. Sea
ice is melting, Arctic waters are becoming more accessible,
extractive industries are expanding, and new trans-Arctic shipping
routes are emerging. While there has been significant progress in
some areas, more must be done to safeguard Arctic waters from the
sweeping change already underway.
Despite the rapid pace of change in the Arctic, there remains
a window of opportunity to put in place additional Arctic-specific
regulations and best practices that will bolster shipping safety and
minimize the impacts of increased shipping on the Arctic marine
environment—impacts that include greater risk of oil spills,

279Jessica

F. Green, Why do we need new rules on shipping emissions? Well, 90
percent of global trade depends on ships, Washington Post (April 17, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/17/why-dowe-need-new-rules-on-shipping-emissions-well-90-of-global-trade-depends-onships/?noredirect=on, [https://perma.cc/3AW5-AN88].
280 See, e.g., Camila Domonoske, Giant Shipper Bets Big On Ending Its Carbon
Emissions. Will It Pay Off? NPR NEWS (July 15, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/07/15/736565697/giant-shipper-bets-big-on-endingits-carbon-emissions-will-it-pay-off, [https://perma.cc/J25S-NSEX].
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discharges of sewage and graywater, subsea noise, ship strikes on
marine mammals, and spread of invasive species.
At the same time, shipping measures are only one
component of a broader solution that must include a comprehensive
governance structure that is able to address impacts from multiple
sectors and uses, and that provides for full and meaningful
involvement of Indigenous Peoples in decision-making. There is an
urgent need to establish both an improved governance structure and
specific protective measures now, before the anticipated increase in
vessel traffic arrives.
Finally, the Arctic is both the canary in the coal mine and a
critical driver for climate change. Global climate change poses
extreme threats to the Arctic, and at the same time a melting Arctic
has impacts on our global climate, weather and sea-level rise. Given
the profound threat posed by global climate change, it is necessary
to reduce—and eventually eliminate—shipping-related greenhouse
gas emissions in the Arctic and on a global scale. At the same time,
global action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and thus slow and
stall the pace of change in the Arctic is critical not only to the future
of the Arctic, but to our world. The mechanisms and opportunities
exist. All that is missing is the political will to implement them.
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